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FEDERAL COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY IN
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
PROCEEDINGS
Jacques Semmelmant
An international extradition treaty obligates the United States
to surrender to a foreign country a person charged with or convicted of an offense in that country. Because many foreign criminal
justice systems lack the substantive rights and procedural safeguards
embodied in American law, a tension exists between the treaty obligation and the rights of the individual facing extradition.
Under the established "rule of non-inquiry," the court determining whether a defendant is extraditable may not examine the requesting country's criminal justice system or take into account the
possibility that the defendant will be mistreated or denied a fair trial
in that country. A defendant who anticipates unfair or abusive treatment following extradition may seek relief on that ground only from
the Secretary of State, who has discretion to deny the extradition
request.' This power also enables the Secretary of State to condition extradition upon assurances from the requesting country that
2
the defendant will receive a fair trial and will not be mistreated. If
t Member, New York bar; former Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York. B.S., Columbia University, 1976; A.M., Harvard University, 1977,
Ph.D., 1980,J.D., 1983. The author wishes to thank Murray R. Stein, Esq., Senior Counsel, Criminal Division, Office of International Affairs, United States Department ofJustice, for his assistance.
1 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1988); see also Emami v. District Court, 834 F.2d 1444, 1454
(9th Cir. 1987) (the decision to extradite is left to the discretion of the executive
branch); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 (6th Cir. 1985) (Courts are not
"empowered to order the extradition of any person. Extradition is an act of the Executive Branch."), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); In re United States, 713 F.2d 105, 109
(5th Cir. 1983) ("[tlhe court lacked the authority to order final extradition; [this] could
only be accomplished by the Secretary of State."); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d
1098, 1105 (5th Cir.) ("[T]he ultimate decision to extradite is a matter within the exclusive prerogative of the Executive .. "), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980) (quoting Peroff
v. Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1977)); Peroffv. Hylton, supra, at 1102 ("mhe ultimate decision to extradite" rests with the executive branch); Shapiro v. Secretary of
State, 499 F.2d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[E]xtradition is ordinarily a matter within
the exclusive purview of the Executive."), af'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424
U.S. 614 (1976).
2 See, e.g., Emami, 834 F.2d at 1454 ("[The State Department alone has the power
to condition the extradition of Emami on an agreement with Germany not to deport
Emami to Iran."); Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 584 ("A decision to attach conditions to an
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assurances are not provided, or if they are untrustworthy or otherwise inadequate to protect the defendant's rights, the Secretary of
State can refuse to extradite.
Critics of the rule of non-inquiry argue that it is inappropriate
to entrust the protection of an individual's rights solely to the executive branch, which may be more concerned with political expediency than with protecting the rights of the accused. 3 They maintain
order of extradition is within the discretion of the Secretary of State .... ); Sindona v.
Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 1980) (Secretary of State may condition extradition on
defendant's continued access to American counsel), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981); In
re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 137 & n.3 (D.N.J. 1987) (Secretary of State has flexibility to
permit extradition subject to certain conditions); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 478 comment d (1987). The Restatement asserts that the Secretary of State
may condition extradition on assurances by the requesting state that the
accused will be tried before ordinary courts, that he will be prosecuted
only for the offense charged, that only the specified penalty will be imposed upon a finding of guilt, or that other practices designed to safeguard the rights of the accused will be observed. Where appropriate, the
Secretary [of State] may condition extradition on the right of a United
States official to observe the proceedings.
Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (1984) ("Secretary of State...
has broad discretion.., to refuse to surrender the person to the requesting country, or
to condition the person's surrender.... [Tihe Secretary's decision [may be based upon]
humanitarian concerns .... "); Note, Extraditionin an Era of Terrorism: The Need to Abolish
the Political Offense Exception, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 654, 692 (1986) (authored by Miriam E.
Sapiro) ("mhe doctrine of specialty enables the requested state to make the grant of
extradition contingent upon agreement regarding procedural or substantive aspects of
the trial or punishment").
3 See, e.g., Reform of the Extradition Laws of the United States: Hearings on H.R. 2643
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 77
(1983) [hereinafter House Hearings, 1983] (statement of Arthur C. Helton, Lawyers
Comm. for Int'l Human Rights) ("To give the Secretary of State an exclusive role in the
extradition context would simply introduce the risk that the decision would be made as a
matter of political expedience"); Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hearingson H.R. 5227
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 60
(1982) [hereinafter House Hearings, 1982] (statement of David Carliner, Esq., appearing
on behalf of the International Human Rights Law Group) ("[Tihe State Department will
inevitably look to the interests of the United States in international relations rather than
to individual rights of the persons whose extradition is being sought."); id. at 65 (testimony of Prof. Richard Falk, Princeton University) ("entrusting discretion in these circumstances to the Secretary of State could be virtually tantamount to making the rights
of individuals an incident of foreign policy"); id. at 73 (testimony of Wade Henderson,
Esq., representing the American Civil Liberties Union) ("The exigencies of diplomacy
render claims that constitutional rights have been violated particularly unsuitable to discretionary review by the executive branch .... ); id. at 213-14 (statement of Prof. Christopher H. Pyle) ("For obvious reasons of state, our diplomats are rarely eager to label
foreign governments unjust, particularly when military and economic advantages hang
in the balance."); Leslie Anderson, Protectingthe Rights of the Requested Person in Extradition
Proceedings: An Argumentfor a HumanitarianException, in TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 153, 164 (1983) ("there is no assurance that the executive, in its concern to maintain foreign relations, will not sacrifice the interests of the individual in
order to achieve national ends"); John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition
Law, 76 GEo. LJ. 1441, 1481 (1988) ("the State Department cannot be trusted to weigh
the rights of individuals against the government's own international law enforcement
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that a United States court should not participate in a procedure that
may lead to the abuse of an individual's rights. 4 Instead, before extradition may occur, a court should be entitled, or even required, to
scrutinize the investigative, judicial, and penal systems of the requesting country and make an independent assessment of how the
defendant is likely to be treated following extradition. 5 Under this
view, judicial determination that the defendant would not receive a
fair trial or would be subjected to serious mistreatment would be
binding on the Secretary of State and would operate to bar
extradition.
6
Although courts have generally not adopted this approach,
some courts have been receptive to the idea that the judiciary has a
role in ensuring that defendants receive fair and humane treatment
upon extradition. Precisely what that role entails remains largely
7
undefined.
and foreign policy agenda"); Edward M. Wise, Some Problems of Extradition, 15 WAYNE L.
REV. 709, 722-23 (1969) ("The question of whether a fugitive will meet with oppressive
treatment is ... [not] suitable for consideration by executive departments, which are
commonly influenced by a fear of offending some fairly despicable regimes"); Comment, ExtraditionReform: The Role of theJudiciaryin Protectingthe Rights of a Requested Individual, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 293, 319 (1986) (authored by Tracy Hughes) (citing
view that "[tihe executive branch cannot be expected to adequately protect individual
rights within the extradition process"); see also Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1050
n.24 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Judgments by the executive branch on extradition matters may,
out of understandable concern for the maintenance of friendly international relatiohs,
be constrained"); Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 415 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("There
may, however, be instances where immediate political, military or economic needs of the
United States induce the State Department to ignore the rights of the accused."), aff'd on
other grounds, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
4 See Barbara Ann Banoff & Christopher H. Pyle, "To Surrender Political Offenders'"
The PoliticalOffense Exception to Extradition in United States Law, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
169, 172 (1984) ("American legal processes should not serve to assist political repression"); Kester, supra note 3, at 1482 ("United States courts should not hand over persons for trial abroad in countries that do not adhere to certain minimal standards of
impartiality and fairness, or that clearly will not provide a reasonably fair trial").
5 See, e.g., House Hearings, 1983, supra note 3, at 83 ("The most appropriate way to
protect against [human rights] abuses would be to maintain the role of an independent
judiciary in the extradition process."); House Hearings, 1982, supra note 3, at 100 (testimony of Prof. Cherif Bassiouni) ("I would be in favor of a rule that permits U.S. courts
to examine whether or not an individual, upon return, will be subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment."); H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1984) ("[T]he
courts, as impartial arbiters, have an important role to play in the protection of human
rights and in ensuring that the extradition process will not be used as a subterfuge for
persecution and unfair treatment"); id. at 58-64; cf.John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry
and the Impact of Human Rights on ExtraditionLaw, 15 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 401,
439 ("The federal courts are required by human rights law to bar extradition to a state
that may violate the extraditee's rights.").
6 See Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 413.
7
See, e.g., In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 147-158 & n.1 (D.N.J. 1987). But see infra
text accompanying notes 147-58; Comment, supra note 3, at 315-20 (discussing alternative models for proposed statutory modification of rule of non-inquiry).
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This Article explores the doctrinal and policy underpinnings of
the rule of non-inquiry and argues in favor of the rule's strict application. Part I reviews certain basic concepts of the law of international extradition, including the rule of non-inquiry.8 Part II
explores the jurisdiction of the federal courts in international extradition proceedings with particular emphasis on issues pertaining to
the rule of non-inquiry. 9 Part III analyzes judicial inroads into the
rule of non-inquiry.' 0 Part IV examines the rule of non-inquiry in
relation to the duty to extradite pursuant to treaty." Part V addresses constitutional aspects of the rule of non-inquiry. 12 Part VI
considers the rule of non-inquiry in the context of policy considerations.1 3 Part VII analyzes the rule of non-inquiry in light of the
"political question" doctrine. Finally, this Article concludes that the
rule of non-inquiry should be inviolate; only the Secretary of State,
not the judiciary, should be entrusted with the power to deny extradition on the ground that the defendant will not receive fair and
14
humane treatment in the requesting country.
I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES

A.

Extradition Procedure

An international extradition proceeding is governed by the applicable treaty, 15 statutes,' 6 and case law. A defendant 17 facing extradition is entitled to a hearing before a judicial officer,' as well as
a review of a finding of extraditability by a United States district
judge via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 19
A foreign government seeking an individual's extradition must
submit a formal request for extradition to the State Department, accompanied by the documents specified in the applicable treaty.
These generally include copies of pertinent statutes, an arrest warrant, and a certificate of conviction or evidence establishing prob8

See infra text accompanying notes 15-52.

9

See infra text accompanying notes 53-117.

10

See infra text accompanying notes 118-67.

11

See infra text accompanying notes 168-209.
See infra text accompanying notes 210-21.

12
13

14
15

See infra text accompanying notes 222-60.

See infra text accompanying notes 261-96.
The United States does not extradite in the absence of a treaty. Valentine v.

United States ex reL Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8-10 (1936); 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
16 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184, 3186, 3188-3195 (1988).

The term "defendant" is used herein to refer to any person facing extradition.
18 A United States magistrate or district judge may preside, although the statute
also permits the hearing to be held before a state judge. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
19 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The scope of habeas corpus review is discussed infra at notes
94-97, 138-44 and accompanying text.
17
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able cause that the defendant committed the crime charged. 20 After
review and approval by the Departments of State and Justice, the
extradition request is forwarded to the United States Attorney for
the district in which the defendant is located, who initiates the extradition proceeding in the United States district court by filing a
21
complaint.
Pursuant to statute, 22 the defendant is entitled to a hearing
before an extradition magistrate. 2 3 This hearing
is not designed as a full trial. The purpose is to inquire into the
presence of probable cause to believe that there has been a violation of one or more of the criminal laws of the extraditing country, that the alleged conduct, if committed in the United States,
would have been a violation of our criminal law, and that the extradited individual is the one sought by the foreign nation for trial
24
on the charge of violation of its criminal laws.

In addition, the defendant has an opportunity at the hearing to
raise certain affirmative defenses. 2 5 Most extradition treaties 26 allow the defense that the crime charged is a non-extraditable "polit27
ical offense."
See, e.g., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
§ 478 comment a (1987); Note,
Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1313 (1962).
21 See generally authorities cited supra note 20.
22 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
23 The presiding judicial officer in an extradition proceeding is traditionally called
an extradition "magistrate" even if he or she is a United States district judge.
24 Peroffv. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977); see also Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 459-61 (1912) ("The issue is confined to
the single question of whether the evidence for the State makes a primafacie case of guilt
sufficient to make it proper to hold the party for trial."); Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S.
457, 463 (1888) ("[T]he proceeding before the commissioner is not to be regarded as in
the nature of a fixed trial ... but rather of the character of those preliminary examinations... before an examining or committing magistrate .. ");Simmons v. Braun, 627
F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The purpose of the hearing is simply to determine
whether the evidence of the fugitive's criminal conduct is sufficient to justify his extradition under an appropriate treaty."); Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 685 (5th Cir. 1969)
("Hearings held pursuant to Section 3184 are in the nature of a preliminary hearing....
[T]he foreign country does not have to show actual guilt, only probable cause that the
fugitive is guilty."), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
25 Very few affirmative defenses may be raised in an extradition proceeding. These
do not include the defense of innocence, Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300, 302 (2d
Cir. 1981); alibi, Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
932 (1978); or insanity, Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
414 U.S. 884 (1973).
26 Steven Lubet & Morris Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciaryin the Extradition
of Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193 (1980).
27
See, e.g., In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), dismissed, 615 F. Supp.
755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Two types of political offenses, "pure" and "relative," are recognized under the law.
A "pure" political offense is an "act that is directed against the state
but which contains none of the elements of ordinary crime," such as sedi20

(1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
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If all of the elements necessary for extradition are present and
the affirmative defenses, if any, are without merit, the magistrate
makes a finding of extraditability and certifies the case to the Secre28
tary of State.
The Secretary of State then conducts an independent review of
the case to determine whether to issue a warrant of surrender. This
review may consider not only the court record, but also submissions
by the parties or materials uncovered independently. The Secretary
29
of State has unfettered discretion whether to issue the warrant,
30
and that decision is not reviewable by the courts.
There is no direct appeal for either the government or the defendant from a court's finding of extraditability. 3 1 In the event the
extradition magistrate denies an extradition request, the government's only recourse is to file a second extradition complaint with
the district court and to commence a de novo proceeding.3 2 If a defendant wishes to challenge a finding of extraditability, he must file
33
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the district court.
Habeas corpus review tests the legality, as opposed to the wisdom,
of extradition.3 4 The losing party may appeal the outcome of the
habeas corpus proceeding to the Court of Appeals.
B.

The Rule of Non-Inquiry

Traditionally, courts follow a "rule of non-inquiry" and refrain
from assessing the requesting government's investigative, legal, and
tion, treason, and espionage[; a] "relative" political offense is one "in
which a common crime is so connected with a political act that the entire
offense is regarded as political."
Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981) (citations

omitted).
28 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
29 See, e.g., Emami v. District Court, 834 F.2d 1444, 1454 (9th Cir. 1987); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986);
Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir.) ("The ultimate decision to
extradite is a matter within the exclusive prerogative of the Executive in the exercise of
its powers to conduct foreign affairs."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980); Peroffv. Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099, 1102 (4th Cir. 1977); Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 499 F.2d 527,
531 (D.C. Cir. 1974), afd sub nom. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976).
30

Peroff, 563 F.2d at 1102-03; Shapiro, 499 F.2d at 530-31; Escobedo, 623 F.2d at

1105.
31

Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364 (1920); Eain, 641 F.2d at 508.
United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491,501 (2d Cir. 1986); Hooker v. Klein, 573
F.2d 1360, 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978); In re Atta, 706 F. Supp.
1032, 1036 & n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
33
See, e.g., Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502,508 (1896); Eain, 641 F.2d at508; Greciv.
Birknes, 527 F.2d 956 (Ist Cir. 1976). There is some authority, however, that a defendant may challenge a finding of extraditability via a declaratory judgment action. See
Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1965); Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 685
n.17 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970).
34 Wacker, 348 F.2d at 606.
32
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penal systems.3 5 They leave the determination of whether the defendant is likely to be treated fairly and humanely entirely to the
36
Department of State.
Courts have applied the rule of non-inquiry in situations involving a wide variety of allegations, many of which, if proven, would
violate due process were the United States Government the offending party. Such situations have included those in which the defendant anticipates abuse, torture, or even murder at the hands of the
requesting country's authorities;3 7 inadequate protection from lawless elements in the requesting country;3 8 prosecution for crimes
not covered by the extradition request;3 9 or a fundamentally unfair
trial, due to bias, 40 restrictions on presenting a defense, 4 1 or the use
of illegally obtained evidence. 42 The rule of non-inquiry has also
governed when a defendant has claimed the protection of the stat35 A separate rule also prohibits courts from examining the motives behind the extradition request: "It is the settled rule that it is within the Secretary of State's sole
discretion to determine whether or not a country's requisition for extradition is made
with a view to try or punish the fugitive for a political crime, i.e., whether the request is a
subterfuge." Eain, 641 F.2d at 513 (citing In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd
per curiam, 241 U.S. 651 (1916)). See, e.g., Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 789 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 133 (2d Cir. 1981);
Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976);
Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 989 (1972); Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F.2d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 1932), aff'd, 290
U.S. 276 (1933); In re Locatelli, 468 F. Supp. 568, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Gonzalez,
217 F. Supp. 717, 722-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
36 Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The degree of risk to [defendant's] life from extradition is an issue that properly falls within the exclusive purview of the executive branch"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981); Escobedo v. United
States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1107 (5th Cir.) (only executive branch may consider defendant's
argument that he should not be extradited because he "may be tortured or killed" in the
requesting country), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980); Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247,
1249 (4th Cir. 1976) (executive branch has sole discretion to deny extradition on humanitarian grounds "when it appears that, if extradited, the individual will be persecuted, not prosecuted, or subjected to grave injustice"); Garcia-Guillern,450 F.2d at 1192
("Neither are we permitted to inquire into the procedure which awaits the appellant
upon his return .... Such matters, so far as they may be pertinent, are left to the State
Department."); Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.) ("The conditions under
which a fugitive is to be surrendered to a foreign country are to be determined solely by
the non-judicial branches of the Government."), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
37 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024, 1031-32 (2d Cir.) (deportation case), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 995 (1986); Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th
Cir. 1983); Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1098; In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127 (D.NJ. 1987).
38 In re Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1321 (1990);
Sindona, 619 F.2d at 174-75; Geisser v. United States, 627 F.2d 745, 749-53 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981); Peroff, 542 F.2d at 1249.
39 Garcia-Guillern,450 F.2d at 1192.
40
In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 128-29 (D.NJ. 1987).
41 Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
42 Magisano v. Locke, 545 F.2d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 1976).
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ute of limitations; 43 double jeopardy; 4 4 breach of a plea agreement
by the requesting country; 4 5 or that the requesting country lacks jurisdiction. 46 For those already convicted, the rule of non-inquiry
has precluded claims that extradition should be barred because the
48
conviction was secured unfairly4 7 or in absentia.
All circuits that have considered the issue have adopted the rule
of non-inquiry, 49 even when the defendant is a United States citizen. 50 Courts have also applied the rule in cases involving deportation 5 ' as well as the transfer of military personnel pursuant to the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement. 5 2
43 Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817
(1984).
44 In re Ryan, 360 F. Supp. 270, 274 (E.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 478 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973).
45 United States v. Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976, 979-80 (D. Vt. 1979).
46 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1986).
47 Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869
(1972) (NATO SOFA Treaty); see infra note 52.
48 Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 78-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960);
Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 263-64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1957); cf.In
re Mylonas, 187 F. Supp. 716, 721 (N.D. Ala. 1960) (although "[t]he fact that the accused
was convicted in absentia would not preclude his extradition," the court denied extradition on other grounds).
49 In re Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (Ist Cir. 1989) (defendant's "request for a deposition and an evidentiary hearing concerning his safety in returning to Italy runs afoul of
the well-established rule of'non-inquiry' in these matters"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1321
(1990); Emami v. District Court, 834 F.2d 1444, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1987) (" '[ain extraditing court will generally not inquire into the procedures or treatment which await a
surrendered fugitive in the requesting country' "); Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 583 ("We do
not supervise the conduct of another judicial system... [and] this court will not inquire
into the procedures which will apply after [the defendant] is surrendered to Israel"); In
re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Respect for the sovereignty of other
nations" precludes judicial scrutiny of requesting country's legal system), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 938 (1981); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir.) ("It is not the
business of our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the
judicial system of another sovereign nation"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976); Peroffv.
Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976) (upholding lower court's refusal to permit
defendant to "introduce testimony about the ... physical risks he would encounter if
actually delivered to the custody of Swedish authorities"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1218 (D.C. Cir.) (declining to review record of
defendants' trial in requesting country), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972); Garcia-Guillern
v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971) ("Neither are we permitted to
inquire into the procedure which awaits the appellant upon his return"), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 989 (1972); In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 136 (D.N.J. 1987) (declining to conduct
evidentiary hearing "on the current and future practices of the Government of India and
the fate of the defendants should they be extradited").
50 Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817
(1984); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1100, 1107 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1036 (1980); Holmes, 459 F.2d at 1217-19 & n.57; United States v. Clark, 470 F.
Supp. 976 (D. Vt. 1979).
51 Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986).
52 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 (effective August
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II
JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN EXTRADITION
PROCEEDINGS

In 1800, in a celebrated speech to the House of Representatives, John Marshall, then a congressman, declared that the power
to extradite pursuant to treaty rests in the executive branch as part
of its power to conduct foreign affairs. 5 3 Marshall's view has since
been endorsed by the Supreme Court. 54 Thus, in the absence of
voluntary delegation by the executive, 55 judicial involvement in
the extradition process, and the resulting encroachment upon executive authority, must be premised upon treaty, statute, or the
56
Constitution.
A.

Extradition between 1794 and 1848

57
The first reported extradition case was United States v. Robins,
in which the defendant, a United States citizen, was accused of participating in a mutiny aboard a British ship. The British government
located the defendant in Charleston, South Carolina; the federal
district judge there issued an arrest warrant, pursuant to which the
defendant was arrested and detained. The defendant contended
that the British navy had impressed him into service and that he had
escaped during a mutiny carried out by other crew members. The
British government asked the President for the defendant's extradi-

23, 1953) ("NATO SOFA Treaty"). See In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984); Plaster
v. United States, 720 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1983); Holmes, 459 F.2d at 1211.
53 See 10 ANNALS OF CONG., 6th Cong., 1st Sess. 596-618 (Mar. 7, 1800), reprinted in
U.S. v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 198-202 (1800). Indeed, between 1794 and
1842 "the Executive exercised complete control over extradition without reference to
the courts." Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513 n.13 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981) (citing M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 505 (1974)); Note, supra note 2, at 669.
54 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 319-20
(1936); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 714 (1893) ("The surrender,
pursuant to treaty stipulations, of persons residing or found in this country, and charged
with crime in another, may be made by the executive authority of the President alone,
when no provision has been made by treaty or by statute for an examination of the case
by a judge or magistrate"); see also Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602, 606, 612 (5th Cir.
1965) ("When there is a treaty or convention for extradition the power is vested in the
executive to surrender the person to a foreign government."); I JOHN B. MOORE, A
TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 549 (1891) ("The function of surrendering fugitive criminals to foreign powers is vested in the United States, in the
President").
55 See In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176, 188 (1847) ("The executive, when the
late demand of the surrender of Metzger was made, very properly as we suppose, referred it to the judgment of a judicial officer."); infra text accompanying notes 69-74.
56 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 714; Doe v.
Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 656 (1853).
57 27 F. Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175).
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tion pursuant to Jay's Treaty, 58 which did not specify the procedures
to be followed in an extradition case. The Secretary of State wrote
to the judge, indicating that the British government had requested
the defendant's extradition and that the "President 'advises and requests' you to deliver him up." 5 9 The judge held that he had jurisdiction over the subject matter and ordered the United States
marshal to deliver the prisoner to a representative of the British
government. 60 The defendant was subsequently hanged by British
6
authorities. '
The case provoked a great deal of controversy 62 and led to a
national demand that there be some exercise of independent judicial authority before an extradition could proceed. 63 The extradition provision of Jay's Treaty, however, expired in 1807. Between
that year and 1842 there were no extradition treaties in effect between the United States and any foreign country. 64
In 1842 the United States and the United Kingdom entered into
the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. 65 Based in part upon the outcry
over the Robins case, 66 the treaty specifically provided for judicial
involvement in the extradition process:
the respective judges and other magistrates of the two Governments shall have power, jurisdiction, and authority, upon complaint made under oath, to issue a warrant for the apprehension of
the fugitive or person so charged, that he may be brought before
such judges or other magistrates, respectively, to the end that the
58
The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, 19 November 1794, United
States-Great Britain, art. 27, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105, reprinted in 12 TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at
13 (Charles I. Bevans, ed. 1974).
59 Robins, 27 F. Cas. at 826-27.
60
Id. at 833.
61
See Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE
LJ. 229, 304, 325 (1990).
62
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570 (1840); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d
122, 134 (2d Cir. 1981); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, UNITED
STATES LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. II, at 48-49 (1987);j. MOORE, supra note 54, at 550 ("The
case created great excitement, and was one of the causes of the overthrow of John
Adams' administration"). In his speech to the House of Representatives, see supra text
accompanying note 53, John Marshall endorsed the handling of the Robins case. The
House debated at length and ultimately affirmed, by a vote of 65 to 39, the correctness
of the procedures that had been followed. See In re Metzger, 17 F. Cas. 232, 233
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9,511).
63 In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 112-13 (1852); M. BASSIOUNx, supra note 62,
ch. II, at 49, 51.
64 Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 574; In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 281,284-85 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1873).
65 Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, United States-United Kingdom, 8 Stat.
572, T.S. No. 119, reprinted in 12 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 82 (Charles I. Bevans, ed. 1974).
66
See Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 112.
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evidence of criminality may be heard and considered; and if, on
such hearing, the evidence be deemed sufficient to sustain the
charge, it shall be the duty of the examining judge or magistrate
to certify the same to the proper Executive authority, that a war-

67
rant may issue for the surrender of such fugitive.

The 1843 treaty between the United States and France 6 8 contained no comparable provision. Nevertheless, in In re Metzger,6 9 ap-

parently due to political pressure, 70 the President solicited judicial
participation in the extradition process. 7 1 In that case, a representative of the French government presented the extradition request directly to the President, who referred the matter to a United States
district judge. The judge conducted a hearing and found sufficient
72
evidence to find the defendant extraditable.
The defendant then filed a habeas corpus petition with the
Supreme Court. The Court expressed approval of the President's
action in voluntarily referring the matter to a district judge, but held
that it had no jurisdiction either to issue a writ of habeas corpus or
to conduct appellate review of the judge's decision. 73 The Court
could not act because the judge had not been exercising article III
powers, but rather a "special authority" in "his chambers, and not
74
in court."
B.

The 1848 Statute

Concern arose in Congress that the absence of federal district
judges in certain parts of the United States was impairing this country's ability to fulfill its treaty obligations. 7 5 This concern, coupled
with the public clamor for judicial involvement in the extradition
process, 76 led to the 1848 enactment of the first extradition statute. 77 The statute, echoing the language of the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty, 78 created the office of extradition magistrate by vesting ju67
68
89.
69

Webster-Ashburton Treaty, supra note 65, at art. X.
Convention for the Surrender of Criminals, Nov. 9, 1843, 8 Stat. 580, T.S. No.

71
72
73

46 U.S. (5 How.) 176 (1847).
See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 62, ch. II, at 49 & n.61.
Id. at 72.
In re Metzger, 17 F. Cas. 232 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9,511).
Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 191.

74
75

Id.
CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 867 (1848) (statement of Rep. Ingersoll); see

70

also In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The prime purpose of the 1848
statute... was to provide additional judicial officers to handle extradition requests."
(citation omitted)).
76 In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 112-13 (1852); see supra text accompanying
notes 62-63.
77 Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, § 5, 9 Stat. 302, 303 [hereinafter 1848 statute].
78

See supra text accompanying note 67.
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risdiction in the justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the United
States district courts, state court judges, and Commissioners spedally appointed for the purpose by any United States court. Extradition magistrates were granted the power to issue arrest warrants
for the apprehension of fugitives sought by a foreign government
79 If
and to examine the sufficiency of the evidence of criminality.
the evidence was sufficient, it was the judicial officer's obligation to
80
certify the defendant for extradition.
Under the 1848 statute, extradition magistrates acted "under
special authority conferred by treaties and acts of Congress";8 1
while the extradition magistrate's responsibility was "in form and
effect judicial,"8 2 it was "not an exercise of any part of what is tech83
nically considered the judicial power of the United States."
84
This principle continues to be reflected in the current statute,
85
which vests jurisdiction in individualjudges rather than in the courts.
This principle is also reflected in the fact that an extradition magistrate's ruling is not appealable.8 6
Amendments to the 1848 statute have not materially altered the
duties or enlarged the jurisdiction of extradition magistrates.8 7 The
jurisdiction of a judicial officer conducting an extradition hearing is
limited to the authority granted by statute:8 8 the power to issue
arrest warrants; to "hear[] and consider[]" the "evidence of crimi79 In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 109. The nature of the proceeding conducted
by the extradition magistrate has been likened to that of a preliminary hearing in a criminal case. See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 459-61 (1912); Benson v. McMahon, 127
U.S. 457, 463 (1888); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
80 In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 109 (1848 statute makes it "the duty of the
Judge or Commissioner to certify" the defendant for extradition if the evidence is sufficient); id. at 128 (Curtis, J., concurring) ("The act of Congress requires the Judge, or
Commissioner, to certify to the Secretary of State" his finding of extraditability).
81 In re Muller, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 501, 506 (1863).
82 1&
83 Id.; see also Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 120 (Curtis,J., concurring) (U.S. Commissioner's authority under 1848 statute is not based upon "any part of the judicial power
of the United States"); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 39 (1851); United
States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 126 &
n.8 (2d Cir. 1981); William Calder's Case, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 91, 96 (1853).
84 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
85 See Doherty, 786 F.2d at 495; Mackin, 668 F.2d at 129-30 & n.11; Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 901 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973);Jimenez v.
Aristeguieta, 290 F.2d 106, 107 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 365 U.S. 840 (1961), vacated as
moot, 375 U.S. 49 (1963); Lubet & Czackes, supra note 26, at 197 n.34, 199.
86 Mackin, 668 F.2d at 129-30. But cf Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1919)
(extradition magistrate's ruling is not appealable because it is not a final order).
87 See Act of August 12, 1848, ch. 167, 66 Rev. Stat. § 5270 (1873-74); Act ofJune
6, 1900, ch. 93, 31 Stat. 656; Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 822; Act of Oct. 17,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1115. The current statute is codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3184 (1988). A comprehensive listing of extradition legislation may be found in M.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 62, ch. II, at 42.
88 See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989) ("When a statute creates
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nality"; and to determine if the evidence is "sufficient to sustain the
charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention."8 9
Nothing in the statute permits an extradition magistrate to examine
the requesting country's procedures,9 0 nor can it reasonably be said
that such authority is inherent. 9 1
The language and history of the extradition statute, therefore,
compel the conclusion that an extradition magistrate is jurisdiction92
ally bound by the rule of non-inquiry.
C.

Habeas Corpus and the Origin of the Rule of Non-Inquiry

If an extradition magistrate has found the defendant extraditable, the defendant may obtain access to a federal district court by
an office to which it assigns specific duties, those duties outline the attributes of the
office.").

89

18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
See Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1066 (2d Cir. 1990) ("there is substantial
authority for the proposition that" inquiry into the foreign country's procedures "is not
a proper matter for consideration by the certifying judicial officer."). By contrast, an
extradition magistrate may consider whether or not a crime charged falls within the
political offense exception contained in the treaty, since the statute authorizes the magistrate to consider whether "the evidence [is] sufficient to sustain the charge under the
provisions of the proper treaty." 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988); see Quinn v. Robinson, 783
F.2d 776, 787 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp.
270, 277 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In addition, the case of United States v. Robins, see supra text
accompanying notes 57-61, had overtones suggesting the crime charged was, in some
broad sense, a "political" offense. Insofar as Congress enacted the 1848 statute in response to the public outcry over Robins, allowing extradition magistrates to decide the
political offense issue is consistent with legislative intent. See Mackin, 668 F.2d at 13435.
91 Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864-65 (even where statute expressly authorizes performance
by federal magistrates of "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States," statute must be construed as authorizing only
those duties that bear some reasonable relation to the ones specified) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) (1988)); see also First Nat'l City Bank v. Aristegnieta, 287 F.2d 219, 225-26 (2d
Cir. 1960) (refusing to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 3184 as providing extradition magistrate
with general inherent power even to issue deposition subpoenas on behalf of requesting
government in extradition proceeding), cert.
granted, 365 U.S. 840 (1961), vacated as moot,
375 U.S. 49 (1963). But cf. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 817 n.41 (9th Cir. 1986)
(extradition magistrate may order discovery).
92
Some courts, even while following the rule of non-inquiry, have apparently overlooked this jurisdictional limitation on the extradition magistrate. See, e.g., In re Singh,
123 F.R.D. 127 (D.NJ. 1987) (extradition magistrate's decision to adhere to rule of noninquiry based upon non-jurisdictional concerns); In re Pazienza, 619 F. Supp. 611, 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (extradition magistrate following rule of non-inquiry based upon principle that "extradition is an international legal act between two sovereign States"); In re
Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 694-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (rejecting on non-jurisdictional
grounds defendant's argument that extradition magistrate should inquire into requesting country's procedures), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on othergrounds sub nom. Sindona v.
Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981); cf Gill v.
Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1049-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (suggesting that extradition magistrate, as opposed to habeas corpus judge, may inquire into requesting country's
procedures).
90
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filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 98 The scope of habeas
corpus review of a finding of extraditability, as originally delineated
in a series of Supreme Court decisions, 94 is extremely limited.
In 1888, the Court listed, as the issues properly before it on
habeas corpus review, whether the Commissioner had jurisdiction
and
whether, under the construction of the act of Congress and the
treaty entered into between this country and Mexico, there was
legal evidence before the commissioner to justify him in exercising his power to commit the person accused to custody to await
the requisition of the Mexican government. 9 5
Two years later, the Court elaborated:
A writ of habeas corpus in a case of extradition cannot perform the
office of a writ of error. If the commissioner has jurisdiction of
the subject matter and of the person of the accused, and the offence charged is within the terms of a treaty of extradition, and
the commissioner, in arriving at a decision to hold the accused,
has before him competent legal evidence on which to exercise his
judgment as to whether the facts are sufficient to establish the
criminality of the accused, for the purposes of extradition, such
decision of the commissioner cannot be reviewed by a Circuit
Court or6 by this court, on habeas corpus, either originally or by
9
appeal.
The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that these listed issues are the
only ones within the scope of a court's authority on habeas corpus
review of a finding of extraditability. However, the Court has not
spoken on the subject since 1926.97

The rule of non-inquiry thus initially arose by implication,
originating in the fact that "the procedures which will occur in the
93

28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988).
In recent years certain lower courts have begun to expand the scope of habeas
corpus review in extradition cases. See, e.g., In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984);
94

Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1983); In re Geisser, 627 F.2d

745 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981); see also infra text accompanying
notes 138-44.
Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888).
In re Luis Oteiza y Cortes, 136 U.S. 330, 334 (1890).
97 See Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S.
309, 314-15 (1922); Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511,516-17 (1916); Charlton v. Kelly,
229 U.S. 447, 456 (1913); McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U.S. 520, 523 (1913); Elias v. Rami95
96

rez, 215 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1910); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 278 (1902); Bryant
v. United States, 167 U.S. 104, 105 (1897); Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 508-09

(1896); see also Hughes v. Gault, 271 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1926) (dictum). The abrupt cessation of Supreme Court consideration of the issue coincided with the enactment of the
so-called 'Judges' Bill." Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. The bill "radically
altered the [Supreme] Court's function, converting what had been a largely mandatory
jurisdiction into a predominantly certiorari (or discretionary) docket." SAMUEL EsTREICHER &JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE 12 (1986).
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demanding country subsequent to extradition were not listed
[by the Supreme Court] as a matter of a federal court's
consideration." 98
The Supreme Court expressly adopted the rule of non-inquiry
in Neely v. Henkel.9 9 Congress had amended the extradition statutes
in 1900 to include a provision for the extradition of fugitives found
in the United States who committed certain enumerated crimes in
"any foreign country or territory... occupied by or under the control of the United States."' 00 The statute provided for the return of
the fugitive "to the authorities in control of such foreign country or
territory... [who] shall secure to such a person a fair and impartial
trial."''
The defendant, facing extradition to Cuba (then under
United States occupation), challenged the constitutionality of the
statute. He argued that it did not ensure him "all of the rights, privileges and immunities that are guaranteed by the Constitution"'' 0 2
upon his surrender to the foreign country, including "the fundamental guarantees of life, liberty and property embodied in that
03
instrument."1
The Court rejected the argument, holding that constitutional
provisions "have no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign country. ' 104 The defendant's United States citizenship made no
difference:
When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country
he cannot complain if required to submit to such modes of trial
and to such punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe
for its own people, unless a different mode be provided for by
treaty stipulations between that country and the United States.10 5
The Court interpreted the statutory requirement of "a fair and
impartial trial" to require nothing more than "a trial according to
the modes established in the country where the crime was committed, provided such trial be had without discrimination against the
accused because of his American citizenship."' 1 06 It noted that
[i]n the judgment of Congress these provisions were deemed ade98 Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960) (citing Ornelas, 161 U.S. at 508).
99
180 U.S. 109 (1901).
100 Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 793, 31 Stat. 656 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3185 (1988)).

101

Id. at 657.

102
103
104
105

Neely, 180 U.S. at 122.

106

Id.

Id

Id.
Id. at 123.
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quate to the ends ofjustice in cases of persons committing crimes
in a foreign country... and subsequently fleeing to this country.
We cannot adjudge that Congress in this matter has abused its
discretion, nor decline to 7enforce obedience to its will as ex0
pressed in the [statute].'
Thus, the Court only required that the foreign country apply its
customary procedures (whatever they entailed), and that it not discriminate based upon United States citizenship.' 0 8 Those requirements were, according to the Court, mandated by the statute, not
the Constitution. 10 9
The court further solidified the rule of non-inquiry in Glucksman
v. Henkel. 10 The defendant, found extraditable to Czarist Russia to
stand trial on forgery charges, argued that he could not be extradited because the complaint against him was "insufficient and defective." 1 1 I Further, since he was about to be "deprived of his liberty
and sent four thousand miles away as a prisoner to stand trial upon
a criminal charge," he maintained the court was obligated to exer"cise the "greatest caution" in determining the legality of his
2
extradition. 1
Finding the complaint legally sufficient, the Court noted that an
extradition proceeding does not require "all the factitious niceties
of a criminal trial at common law"; 113 so long as there is "reasonable ground to suppose [the defendant] guilty as to make it proper
that he should be tried, good faith to the demanding government
requires his surrender." 114 The Court then added that "[w]e are
bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the
trial will be fair."' 15
A Supreme Court decision outside of the extradition context
has added support for the rule of non-inquiry. Several courts have
cited Wilson v. Gerard,116 in which the Supreme Court reversed a
lower court's judgment enjoining the Secretary of Defense from
turning over an American soldier to Japan for criminal prosecution.
In its decision, the Court did not consider the nature of the pro7
ceedings the defendant faced in the Japanese courts."
107
108

Id.

109

See also In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 138 (D.NJ. 1987) (fair trial requirement in

Id. at 122-23.

Neely is based entirely on statute, not the Constitution.).
110 221 U.S. 508 (1911).
M1 Id. at 510.
112

Id. at 511.

113

Id at 512.

114

Id.

115
116

Id. (dictum).

117

354 U.S. 524 (1957).
Although the Court made no direct reference to the issue, evidence regarding
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III
INROADS INTO THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY

In an era which has witnessed the unprecedented expansion of
the rights of criminal defendants,' 18 it is not surprising that the rule
of non-inquiry has not remained wholly unaffected. Unlike the radical changes in other areas of the law, however, the erosion of the
rule of non-inquiry has been gradual and very limited. Some courts
have begun to speak of exceptions to the rule of non-inquiry and
have implied that circumstances may exist which would allow a court
to bar extradition due to the treatment the defendant is likely to
receive in the requesting country.
The first inroad into the rule of non-inquiry, and the source of
nearly every attempt to undermine the rule, appeared in 1960 in the
form of dictum issued by the Second Circuit in Gallina v. Fraser.119
Gallina had been convicted in absentia in Italy, which sought his
extradition from the United States. He contended that if extradited,
Italy would imprison him without retrial and without giving him the
opportunity to confront his accusers or present a defense. 120 The
Second Circuit applied the rule of non-inquiry and reaffirmed its
validity, noting:
[W]e have discovered no case authorizing a federal court, in a
habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition from the
United States to a foreign nation, to inquire into the procedures
which await the relator upon extradition .

.

. The authority that

does exist points clearly to the proposition that the conditions
under which a fugitive is to be surrendered to a foreign country
are to be determined solely by the non-judicial branches of the
Government.121

The court, however, "confess[ed] to some disquiet"' 22 over this
rule. It suggested that reconsideration of the rule might be appropriate where a defendant faced procedures sufficiently "antipathetic
the Japanese procedures was in the record, id at 547-48, and the defendant had specifically raised the issue with the Court. See Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1195 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1219 n.58 (D.C.
Cir.) ("notwithstanding the serviceman's specific claim that the absence of due process
in the Japanese judicial system would deprive him of a fair trial in the Japanese courts
... the Court found 'no constitutional or statutory barrier' to the surrender"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972); Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 851 (1960); In re Ryan, 360 F. Supp. 270, 274 (E.D.N.Y.), af'd, 478 F.2d 1397 (2d
Cir. 1973).
118 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 33-34, 6068 (1985) (describing the Supreme Court's expansion of the rights accorded criminal

defendants).
119 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
120
121
122

Id. at 78.
Id. at 78-79.
Id. at 79.
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to a federal court's sense of decency."' 23 The court did not identify
the source of its power to examine the requesting country's procedures. Indeed, the court offered no analysis whatsoever and made
124
no effort to reconcile its dictum with the holding of Neely v. Henkel.
125
it
Although the Gallina dictum has never gained the force of law,
126
has been cited by some courts with approval.
The Second Circuit itself has expressed varying views on the
Gallina dictum, ranging from apparent endorsement 27 to qualified
12 9
approval 128 to, most recently, strong disapproval.
That court expressed its strongest endorsement of the Gallina
dictum in Rosado v. Civiletti. 3 0° The court held that prisoners convicted in Mexico under procedures utterly devoid of due process,
and then incarcerated in the United States pursuant to a prisoner
transfer treaty, could utilize the habeas corpus mechanism to challenge the legality of their detention.' 3 ' Foraging for support, the
court digressed into the law of extradition. Citing the Gallinadictum,
the court suggested that "the presumption of fairness routinely accorded the criminal process of a foreign sovereign may require
closer scrutiny if a relator persuasively demonstrates that extradition would expose him to procedures or punishment 'antipathetic to
a federal court's sense of decency.' "132 Circumventing Neely v. Henkel,' 3 3 the Second Circuit mischaracterized that case as standing for
the proposition that a defendant "cannot prevent his extradition
simply by alleging that the criminal process he will receive fails to accord with constitutional guarantees."' 1 4 The court thus implied
that the Supreme Court had stated or suggested that a defendant
who could prove the allegation could thereby prevent his extradition. The court further attempted to limit the applicability of Neely
123
124
125

Id.

180 U.S. 109 (1901). See supra text accompanying notes 99-109.
Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983) (the
exception suggested in the Gallina dictum "has yet to be employed in an extradition
case"); Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The Gallina exception
to the rule of non-inquiry has apparently yet to be invoked to prevent extradition."),
aff'd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
126
See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler, 721 F.2d at 683.
127 Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856
(1980).
128
Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912
(1981); United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 928-29 (2d Cir. 1974).
129 Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (2d Cir. 1990).
130 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980).
131
The court found, however, that as part of the transfer agreement, the petitioners
had waived their rights to challenge the validity of the Mexican convictions. Id at 1182.
132
Id at 1195 (quoting Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960)).
133 For a discussion of the Neely decision, see supra text accompanying notes 99-109.
134
Rosado, 621 F.2d at 1195 (emphasis added).
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by observing that in that case, "minimal safeguards to ensure a fair
trial in the foreign tribunal were provided."' 13 5 Again the Second
Circuit implied that the absence of such safeguards could serve as a
constitutional bar to extradition-a conclusion nowhere to be
36
found, even by implication, in the Supreme Court's opinion.'
The Second Circuit concluded that "although the Constitution
cannot limit the power of a foreign sovereign to prescribe procedures for the trial and punishment of crimes committed within its
territory, it does govern the manner in which the United States may
join the effort."' 13 7 The court did not explain what it meant by joining the effort. The ambiguity suggests two possible approaches,
each of which expands the scope of habeas corpus review beyond
that outlined by the Supreme Court. 3 8 Both have found at least
some support among lower courts.
The first approach focuses exclusively upon the conduct of the
United States.' 3 9 Under this approach, extradition may be barred
upon a showing that wrongful behavior of the United States, usually
unrelated to the defendant's expected treatment in the requesting
country, renders extradition violative of the defendant's constitutional rights.140 This approach preserves the traditional rule of non135

Id.

See supra text accompanying notes 104-09.
Rosado, 621 F.2d at 1195-96.
See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
Traditionally, courts have held that the conduct of the United States government
in an extradition proceeding is subject to constitutional constraints. Grin v. Shine, 187
U.S. 181, 184 (1902); Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 348 (4th Cir. 1983); Geisser
v. United States, 627 F.2d 745, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981);
Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 1960). Extradition proceedings conducted in
accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181 - 3195 (1988), comply with the requirements of procedural due process. Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980); Peroffv. Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099, 1103 (4th Cir. 1977); see
also Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 686 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970)
(extradition of United States citizen from Canal Zone to Panama withoutjudicial hearing
and solely upon determination by Chief Executive of Canal Zone that defendant is extraditable is not a denial of due process because habeas corpus review is available in United
States district court).
140
See Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 1988) ("to the extent
Sahagian challenges the procedures under which the federal officials procured his arrest
and extradition, those procedures 'must be assessed in light of the Constitution' "), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1087 (1989); Romeo v. Roache, 820 F.2d 540, 545 (1st Cir. 1987)
("More egregious [United States] governmental conduct than that alleged here would
be required before a court should interfere in international affairs by denying foreign
states their rights under extradition treaties."); In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1487 (7th Cir.
1984) (decision of United States government to extradite may not be based upon "such
constitutionally impermissible factors as race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or
political beliefs"); Prushinowski v. Samples, 734 F.2d 1016, 1018 (4th Cir. 1984) ("It is
established that constitutional questions of deprivation of rights are addressed only to
the acts of the United States Government and not to those of a foreign nation, at least
for purposes of determining questions of extraditability."); Plaster, 720 F.2d at 349 n.9
136

137
138
139
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inquiry into the foreign country's procedures and is thus fully consistent with Neely v. Henkel. However, it expands the scope of habeas
corpus review 14 1 to encompass violations of constitutional rights by
142
agents of the United States.
The second approach expands the scope of habeas corpus review even further to allow at least some inquiry into the procedures
the defendant faces in the requesting country. This approach,
which would theoretically permit the court to bar extradition upon a showing that the procedures are "particularly atrocious" or
"shock the conscience,"' x4 3 raises serious doctrinal and policy
("It is settled that the petitioner cannot block his extradition simply because the other
country's judicial procedures do not comport with the requirements of our constitution
....Instead, he must claim that the conduct of our government is violating his constitutional rights."); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1218 (D.C. Cir.) (while "American
officials having custody of appellants are fully subject to constitutional commands, it
must be remembered that the contemplated surrender is the precise response required
of the United States by its treaty commitments to the [requesting nation]. The Constitution plays no part in this case unless somehow it operates to negate those commitments
in the circumstances appellants allege."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972); In re Singh,
123 F.R.D. 127, 139 (D.N.J. 1987) ("Defendants here do not challenge any action of the
[United States] Government. Instead, they challenge the actions of the Government of
India.").
141 In the related cases of Burt, 737 F.2d at 1482-84 and Plaster,720 F.2d at 348, the
courts rejected the government's contention that the scope of habeas corpus review was
narrowly confined to the issues delineated by the Supreme Court in the line of cases
which culminated with Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925). See supra text accompanying notes 95-97. The Seventh Circuit observed that "[o]nly subsequent to Fernandez
did the Supreme Court substantially redefine the scope of habeas corpus review, which
previously had been tied to an examination ofjurisdictional defects, to include an evaluation of whether the petitioner is being held in violation of any of his or her constitutional rights." Burt, 737 F.2d at 1484. Both courts concluded that habeas corpus could
be used to challenge any unconstitutional conduct by the executive branch, including a
decision to extradite based upon constitutionally impermissible considerations such as
race or religion. Cf. Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1064-65 (2d Cir. 1990) (expressly
reaffirming Fernandez as defining the scope of habeas corpus review in an extradition
proceeding, but also observing that "the Government's conduct violated neither the
Constitution nor established principles of international law.").
142 Several courts have recognized that extradition may be barred if it would violate
promises made by representatives of the United States. See Burt, 737 F.2d at 1487
(courts will not bar extradition on constitutional grounds "so long as the United States
has not breached a specific promise to an accused regarding his or her extradition");
Plaster,720 F.2d at 332 (breach of immunity agreement by the United States, if proven,
could serve as constitutional bar to defendant's extradition); Geisser, 627 F.2d at 749-50
(fact that defendant, upon extradition to Switzerland, faced realistic possibility of being
murdered in prison by drug traffickers did not present a constitutional issue; defendant's
"claim of constitutional right has no independent strength beyond the resolution of the
single question of whether the [United States] government has carried out its promise
under the plea bargain which was made"); Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp.
1252, 1258 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1977) ("[A] breached plea bargain may in some instances form
the basis for an order enjoining extradition.").
14' Sahagian, 864 F.2d at 514 (While "[t]he Constitution may impose some limitations upon extradition decisions in exceptional cases due to some 'particularly atrocious
procedures or punishments employed by the foreign jurisdiction,'" such a circumstance
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4

concerns. 14
No court has yet denied extradition based upon the defendant's
anticipated treatment in the requesting country. Citing the rule of
non-inquiry, most courts have refused to conduct hearings into requesting countries' procedures.' 45 Nevertheless, some of these
courts have implicitly endorsed the second approach by qualifying
findings of extraditability with the observation that the defendant
failed to make a showing of possible mistreatment. 146
was not present.); Burt, 737 F.2d at 1487 ("exceptional constitutional limitations [on
extradition] ... may exist because of particularly attrocious [sic] procedures or punishments employed by the foreign jurisdiction"); Prushinowsky v. Samples, 734 F.2d 1016,
1019 (4th Cir. 1984) (court would not likely permit extradition to a country where "the
prisons ... regularly opened each day's proceedings with a hundred lashes applied to
the back of each prisoner who did not deny his or her God or conducted routine breakings on the wheel for every prisoner"); Esposito v. Adams, 700 F. Supp. 1470, 1481
(N.D. I1. 1988) (allowing extradition after finding that circumstances of defendant's
conviction in Italy in absentia "were far from lacking 'even the barest rudiments of a
process calculated to arrive at the truth of the accusations' "); see also Barr v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 819 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1987). In that case, which involved the
Swiss government's freezing of plaintiff's assets at the request of the United States, the
court noted that plaintiff
does not claim, nor do we find, that the actions of the Swiss authorities
were intrinsically violative of fundamental fairness. Accordingly, there is
no need to apply in this case the recognized principle that, regardless of
the degree of American government involvement in the conduct of a foreign sovereign, the federal courts will not allow themselves to be placed
in the position of putting their imprimatur on unconscionable conduct.
Id. at 27 n.2.
144
See infra discussion accompanying notes 168-296.
145
See, e.g.,Inre Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (lstCir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1321
(1990); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1986); Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir.
1983); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912
(1981); Peroffv. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977); In re Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. 1058, 1068-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Singh,
123 F.R.D. 127, 140 (D.N.J. 1987).
146 See, e.g., Manzi, 888 F.2d at 206 ("Given this well-established rule [of non-inquiry] and Manzi's failure to produce any factual evidence of a threat to his safety, the
magistrate acted properly in denying Manzi's request for a deposition and an evidentiary
hearing."); Sahagian, 864 F.2d at 514 (7th Cir. 1988) (while "[t]he Constitution may
impose some limitations upon extradition decisions in exceptional cases due to some
'particularly atrocious procedures or punishments employed by the foreign jurisdiction,' " such a circumstance was not present) (quoting Burt, 737 F.2d at 1487); Emami v.
District Court, 834 F.2d 1444, 1453 (9th Cir. 1987) (court rejected the defendant's claim
that he should not be extradited due to ill health, because court-appointed cardiologist
found no serious health condition, and because requesting country indicated that it
would provide adequate medical treatment); Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 583 ("There is absolutely no showing in this record that Israel will follow procedures which would shock this
court's 'sense of decency'. "); Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler, 721 F.2d at 683 ("In light of Iceland's outstanding human rights' [sic] record and appellant's uncorroborated prediction
of maltreatment, the district court had no obligation to hold an evidentiary hearing to
consider the claim"); United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 928 (2d
Cir. 1974) (the court's "sense of decency" was "not shocked" by the circumstances of
the defendants' convictions or by the sentences they faced upon extradition to Canada);
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Recently, in Ahmad v. Wigen, 14 7 the Second Circuit apparently
repudiated the Gallina dictum. Ahmad belonged to the Abu Nidal
Organization, an international terrorist group with roots in the Middle East. The court found him extraditable to Israel to stand trial
for murder. 148 On habeas corpus review of the extradition magistrate's decision, Ahmad claimed that if extradited, he would be tortured by Israeli agents, denied a fair trial, and subjected to
inhumane treatment in prison. He contended that extradition
should be barred because it would violate "fundamental principles
of due process and human rights."' 4 9 While disagreeing with the
allegations, the United States Government 50 contended that even if
true they could only be addressed to the Secretary of State; the rule
of non-inquiry prohibited the court from considering the defendant's claims. 15 1
The district judge rejected the government's position and created a "Due Process Exception to the Rule of Non-Inquiry,"' 52 declaring that another nation cannot use American courts "to obtain

power over a fugitive intending to deny that person due process."

53

The court maintained that "we cannot blind ourselves to

the foreseeable and probable results of the exercise of our jurisdiction." 1 54 Rejecting the rule of non-inquiry, the district judge found
that as an independent branch of government, the courts have a
duty "to stand between the executive and the accused where a case
of abdication of State Department responsibility for the protection

of the accused has been made out."'155 Furthermore, "court[s] must
ensure that [they are] not used for purposes which do not comport
Esposito v. Adams, 700 F. Supp. 1470, 1481 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("the 'evidence' provided
by the petitioner is not sufficient to justify his attack on the Italian criminal justice system."); In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("Sindona has not made
even a threshold showing that he would be subjected to procedures in Italy which would
be so violative of human rights as to prevent extradition."), aff'd in partand rev'd inpart on
other groundssub nom. Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
912 (1981).
147 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
148 For the details of the crime and Ahmad's subsequent arrest, see In re Atta, 706 F.
Supp. 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (proceeding to extradite Ahmad to Israel).
149 Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 1063
(2d Cir.), stay denied, 111 S. Ct. 23 (1990).
150 The author was counsel for the government.
151
The government petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for a
writ of mandamus to prevent the district court from inquiring into the requesting country's procedures. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 395. The petition was denied without opinion.
In re United States, No. 89-3025 (2d Cir. June 19, 1989).
152 Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 410-11.
153 Id. at 410.
154 Id.
155 IdL at 412.
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with our Constitution or principles of fundamental fairness."

15 6

The district-court heard extensive testimony from expert and
fact witnesses, and reviewed numerous reports, affidavits, and other
written materials concerning Israel's law enforcement procedures
and the treatment of its prisoners. 157 After the hearing, the judge
found that Ahmad had failed to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that he would be tortured, denied a fair trial, or would
otherwise suffer mistreatment.' 58 The habeas corpus petition was
dismissed.
Ahmad appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal
and found it "improper" for the district judge to have inquired into
Israel's criminal justice system. The court noted that
[t]he interests of international comity are ill-served by requiring a
foreign nation such as Israel to satisfy a United States district
judge concerning the fairness of its laws and the manner in which
they are enforced. It is the function of the Secretary of State to
determine whether extradition should be denied on humanitarian
grounds. 159

The Court of Appeals ruled that "[a] consideration of the procedures that will or may occur in the requesting country is not within
the purview of a habeas corpus judge."'160
Diversity of opinion on the rule of non-inquiry has not been
confined to courts and commentators. In the early 1980s Congress
attempted to implement broad extradition reforms. Legislation
passed by the Senate' 6 1 would have codified the rule of noninquiry. 162 Originally, legislation proposed in the House 63 would
156

Id.

157

Id. at 416-20.

158

Id.

159 Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d. Cir.), stay denied, 111 S. Ct. 23 (1990)
(citation omitted).
160 Id. at 1066. Strictly speaking, the ruling was dictum because the Court of Appeals agreed with the district judge's finding that Ahmad would be treated fairly and
humanely in Israel. Id. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit left no doubt that it strongly
disapproved of the district judge's behavior.
161
S.1940, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. 22,379-83 (1982).
162 The proposed codification included the following language: "Any issue as to
whether the extradition of a person to a foreign state would be incompatible with humanitarian considerations shall be determined by the Secretary of State in the discretion
of the Secretary of State." Id. § 3194(g)(2), 128 CONG. REc. at 22,381. The proposed
statute required the Secretary of State to "consult with the appropriate Bureaus and
Offices of the Department of State including the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs." Id. at § 3194(g)(3), 128 CONG. REc. at 22,381. After various amendments by the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
bill passed the Senate on August 19, 1982. See 128 CONG. REc. at 22,353. Its counterpart, H.R. 6046, was approved by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee
on theJudiciary, see H.R. REP. No. 627, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), but did not pass the
House.
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have had the same effect. However, the Judiciary Committee
1 65
amended proposed House legislation' 64 to include a proposal
that would have required a court to examine the procedures facing
the defendant in the requesting country. 16 6 These and other differences were never reconciled. Consequently, no legislation was
67
enacted.'
IV
THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY AND THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE

A judicial departure from the rule of non-inquiry does not
merely affect "the interests of international comity."' 68 Refusal to
extradite based upon humanitarian concerns conflicts directly with
the duty to extradite pursuant to a treaty. Any departure from the
rule of non-inquiry must therefore be premised upon a doctrinal
basis sufficient to override a treaty obligation of the United States.
Extradition treaties, which are the "supreme Law of the
Land,"' 169 are negotiated by the executive and are subject to the
"Advice and Consent" of the Senate. 170 Historically commentators
have disagreed whether, in the absence of an extradition treaty, na17 1
tions have a duty to extradite under customary international law.
163

H.R. 2643, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H2249 (daily ed. April 20,

1983).
164 The amended bill was reintroduced as H.R. 3347. See 129 CONG. REC. H4102
(daily ed.June 16, 1983). It was ordered reported to the House, but no report was filed,
apparently because ofJustice Department opposition and controversy within the Com-

mittee. M. BASSbOUNI, supra note 62, ch. II, at 47. The proposed elimination of the rule
of non-inquiry was one of the controversial subjects. Id.
165 H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, 58-64 (1984).

166 The amended bill provided that "[t]he court shall not order a person extraditable after a hearing... if the court finds... the person has established by a preponderance of the evidence that such person... would, as a result of extradition, be subjected
to fundamental unfairness." H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3194(d)(2)(D)(ii). This
amendment, proposed by Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, would have imposed an
"affirmative duty" on the court to inquire into the requesting country's procedures.
H.R. Rep. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6. It followed a less drastic proposal by Congressman Charles Schumer that would have given courts discretion to circumvent the
rule of non-inquiry in cases "shocking to the conscience" of the court. Id. at 4.
167 A comprehensive listing of the various legislative proposals put forth between
1981 and 1984 may be found in M. BAssIOUNI, supra note 62, ch. II, at 43-48. See also
Note, supra note 2, at 681-83 (discussing legislative proposals).
168
Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir.), stay denied, 111 S. Ct. 23 (1990).
169
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
170 Id. art. II, § 2.
171
See M. BAssIouNI, supra note 62, ch. I, at 10-12. The prevailing contemporary
view is that, in the absence of a treaty, a state may refuse extradition and grant asylum.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, Introductory Note at 557 (1987); CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION 44-45
(1980); C.L. Cantrell, The PoliticalOffense Exemption in InternationalExtradition: A Comparison of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 777, 783
(1977).
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The United States, which considers extradition to be strictly a function of domestic law,' 7 2 does not recognize a duty to surrender in
the absence of a treaty.' 73 Indeed, United States law prohibits ex75
tradition not based upon a statute174 or treaty obligation.1
Substantial authority supports the proposition that by entering
into an extradition treaty, a state waives its right to grant asylum
under international 76 and domestic law. 17 7 The Supreme Court
has repeatedly spoken of the obligation to surrender fugitives pursuant to extradition treaties.' 7 8 The Court has noted: "The surrender of a fugitive, duly charged in the country from which he has fled
with a non-political offense and one generally recognized as criminal at the place of asylum, involves no impairment of any legitimate
79
public or private interest."'
A few extradition treaties contain provisions that permit' 8 0 or
172 M. BAsSIoUNI, supra note 62, ch. II, at 56; Cantrell, supra note 171, at 815. However, courts do rely upon principles of customary international law "in construing the
meaning of treaty provisions." M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 62, ch. II, at 94.
173 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
174 Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 463 (1912); Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 191
(1902).
175 Valentine v. United States ixreL Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); 18 U.S.C. § 3184
(1988).
176

M. BAsSIOUNI, supra note 62, ch. 11, at 102-03; C. VAN DEN WUNGAERT, supra note

171, at 45 ("extradition treaties have to be viewed as exceptions to the general principle
of asylum: they contemplate the creation of a duty to extradite"); see United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-412 (1886).
177 Extradition treaties generally provide that the requested state "shall" surrender
the fugitive if the specified conditions for surrender have been met. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 475 comment g (1987). But see M. BASSIOUNI, supra
note 62, ch. II, at 102 ("U.S. jurisprudence reflects the view that an extradition treaty
does not per se create an obligation to extradite").
178 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) (extradition treaty gives rise
to "legal right to demand [a fugitive's] extradition and the correlative duty to surrender
him to the demanding country"); Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 518 (1916) (whenever statutory requirements are satisfied, "a fair observance of the obligations of the
treaty requires that [the fugitive] be surrendered."); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 476
(1912) ("the obligation to surrender [a fugitive is] imposed by the treaty as the supreme
law of the land"); Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911) (as long as there is
probable cause to believe defendant guilty, "good faith to the demanding government
requires his surrender"); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 62 (1902) ("The demanding
government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do is entitled to
the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government
is under obligation to make the surrender."); Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 191 (1902)
(extradition pursuant to treaty "is undoubtedly obligatory upon both powers"); see also
Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 263-64 (6th Cir.) (while reluctant to find defendant
extraditable to Italy to face life in prison pursuant to conviction in absentia for crime
committed 30 years earlier, court nevertheless acknowledged such an obligation), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1957).
179 Factor, 290 U.S. at 298 (emphasis added).
180 E.g., Extradition Treaty, May 11, 1980, United States-Finland, art. 7, no. 1(c), 31
U.S.T. 944, T.I.A.S. No. 9626; Extradition Treaty,June 24, 1980, United States-Netherlands, art. 7, no. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 10733, at 5.
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require' 8 1 the requested state to refuse to extradite where there is
reason to believe extradition would be incompatible with humanitarian considerations. 18 2 Since extradition treaties are considered
184
self-executing, 183 such provisions are judicially enforceable.
Absent an exception contained in the treaty itself, a judicial' 8 5
bar to extradition on humanitarian grounds must be premised upon
another treaty, a statute, 18 6 or the Constitution. 18 7 Each provides
authority to override the treaty obligation. Pursuant to its broad
power to pass legislation regarding enforcement of treaties, 18 8 and
181
E.g., Convention on Extradition, Oct. 24, 1961, United States-Sweden, art. V, no.
6, 14 U.S.T. 1845, T.I.A.S. No. 5496; see also Treaty on Extradition, July 13, 1983,
United States-Ireland, art. IV, § c, T.I.A.S. No. 10813, at 7 (extradition precluded if
"there are substantial grounds for believing that a request for extradition ... has been
made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's
race, religion, nationality, or political opinion."). The Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, June 25, 1985, United States-United Kingdom, art. 3(a), S. ExEc. REP. No 17,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17 (1986), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1104 (1985), precludes extradition if the defendant "establishes to the satisfaction of the competent judicial authorities
... that he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or
restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political
opinions." For a discussion of the treaty, see Note, Questions ofJustice: U.S. Courts'Powers
of Inquiry Under Article 3(a) of the United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 474 (1987).
182
Scandinavian countries "are required by their domestic extradition laws to include treaty provisions granting a requested nation absolute discretion to refuse to allow
extradition on any 'humanitarian' grounds." Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914,
920 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 971 (1981); see Anderson, supra note 3, at 164 & n.89.
183 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 62, ch. II, at 74; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA7IONS § 476 comment a (1987) ("typically observance of the requirements and
conditions for extradition may be invoked by the person sought to be extradited").
184
Absent, of course, an express contrary provision in the treaty. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, June 24, 1980, United States-Netherlands, art. 7, no. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 10733,
at 5 (applicability of humanitarian exception to extradition is to be assessed by "the
Executive Authority of the Requested State"); see also Treaty on Extradition, July 13,
1983, United States-Ireland, art. IV, § c, T.I.A.S. No. 10813, at 7 (decision whether to
deny extradition because request has been made in order to punish defendant on account of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion should be made by the executive
branch).
185
Courts are "under the same obligation to enforce extradition treaties as they are
to enforce the Constitution and the laws of Congress." M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 62, ch.
II, at 74. By contrast, the President arguably may constitutionally refuse to comply with
a treaty obligation. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrruTiON 214 (1972).
f. Jordan J. Paust, The President Is Bound by InternationalLaw, in Agora: May the President
Violate Customary InternationalLaw (cont'd), 81 AM.J. INT'L L. 371, 383 (1987) ("[t]he President has no authority or power lawfully to act inconsistently with a treaty obligation").
186
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 714 (1893); Head Money Cases,

112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884); M.

BASSIOUNI,

supra note 62, ch. II, at 75; L. HENKIN, supra

note 185, at 163.
187
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267
(1890); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 656 (1853); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); L.
HENKIN, supra note 185, at 137.
188 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S.

at 598-99.
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comparable authority to pass legislation concerning extradition, 18 9
Congress has enacted a statute that expressly provides the Secretary
of State with discretionary power to refuse to extradite.19 0 However, no statute provides the judiciary with similar authority. 19 1 To
the contrary, existing statutory language 92 and the history of extradition legislation 9 evidence an intent by Congress not to confer
194
such authority upon the judiciary.
It has been suggested that deviation from the rule of non-inquiry might be justified pursuant to various international conven19 6
tions, 195 such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
19 7
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
or the
American Convention on Human Rights. 198 However, these conventions are not treaties of the United States and therefore do not
189
Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 191 (1922) ("Congress has a perfect right to provide
for the extradition of criminals in its own way, with or without a treaty to that effect, and
to declare that foreign criminals shall be surrendered upon such proofs of criminality as
it may judge sufficient"); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 463-64 (1913).
190
18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1988) (Secretary of State "may order the person" extradited
following judicial finding of extraditability) (emphasis added); see also In re Stupp, 23 F.
Cas. 296, 302 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 13,563) (interpreting similarly-worded predecessor statute to 18 U.S.C. § 3186 as endowing Secretary of State with power to refuse
to surrender the accused). In addition, the Constitution does not prohibit the executive
from refusing to extradite in violation of a treaty obligation. See L. HENKIN, supra note
185, at 214.
191
A number of countries have statutes allowing their courts to deny extradition
based upon proof that the defendant will be persecuted in the requesting country. See
H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60 (1984) (citing statutes of Australia, Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, India, Israel, New Zealand, Sweden, and
Switzerland).
192
The only United States statute expressly calling for the involvement of members
of the judiciary in the extradition process provides that an extradition magistrate who
"deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper
treaty ... shall certify the same.., to the Secretary of State." 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988)
(emphasis added).
193
See supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
194 See H.R. Rep. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1984) (questioning whether, in
the absence of additional statutory authorization, "the Federal courts would have clear
jurisdiction to protect persons being sought for extradition from political persecution
and/or fundamental unfairness upon their return"); see also supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text (discussing attempts at legislative reform and failure to enact legislation eliminating or modifying rule of non-inquiry).
195 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 62, ch. VII, at 376 (arguing that departure from rule of
non-inquiry "could easily rely on existing international instruments binding upon the
United States").
196 G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); cf. C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT,
supra note 171, at 7 n.38 ("the right of asylum as meant by art. 14 of the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights" does not encompass relief for "those who have
committed very serious common crimes").
197 G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
198 O.A.S. Official Records OEA Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2, reprinted
in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
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provide a basis for overriding a treaty obligation.' 99 Moreover, they
are not self-executing. Accordingly, absent a protest by a government, courts cannot base a denial of extradition on the
200
conventions.
The Protocol to the United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees 20 1 is a treaty of the United States but provides no
20 2
basis for refusing extradition for "serious non-political" crimes.
The United States has yet to ratify the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which would prohibit extradition where there
are "substantial grounds for believing" the defendant "would be in
'20 3
danger of being subjected to torture.
199 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-2 (1988); TREATIES AFFAIRS STAFF, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1990). But cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883
(1980) ("[I]t has been observed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 'no
longer fits into the dichotomy of "binding treaty" against "non-binding pronouncement," but is rather an authoritative statement of the international community.' ")
(quoting E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 70 (1964)).
200 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 62, ch. X, at 630; see Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373-76 (7th Cir. 1985); Dickens v. Lewis, 750 F.2d 1251, 1254
(5th Cir. 1984); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808-10, 818-19 (Bork, J., concurring); United
States i rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975); Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aft'd, 910 F.2d 1063
(2d Cir. 1990); American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 767-70 (N.D.
Cal. 1989) (deportation case).
201
19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1967).
202
See Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980) (Protocol excludes from
protection "any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering
that.., he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981).
But cf. Nicosia v. Wall, 442 F.2d 1005, 1006-07 (5th Cir. 1971) (extradition may be
barred pursuant to U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees where "the government concedes" its applicability); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 476
comment h (1987); M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 62, ch. VII, at 376; Comment, supra note 3,
at 311 ("If a person qualifies as a refugee, the Protocol forbids the individual's return
unless a reason exists to regard the individual as a security risk to the country of refuge
or a danger to the community.").
203
39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/506 (1984), entered into
force June 26, 1987, reprintedin 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1028 (1984), as mod. 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
Article 3 provides that "No State Party shall ... extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture." Whether or not such grounds exist are to be determined by
"competent authorities." The United States signed the Convention on April 18, 1988.
On May 20, 1988, President Reagan formally transmitted the Convention to the Senate
for its "advice and consent to ratification." S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. iii-iv (1988). The Letter of Transmittal noted that "it was not possible to negotiate
a [multi-lateral] treaty that was acceptable to the United States in all respects," so that
ratification was recommended subject to "certain reservations, understandings, and declarations." Id. Among these were that "[tihe United States declares that the phrase
'competent authorities,' as used in Article 3 of the Convention, refers to the Secretary of
State in extradition cases and to the Attorney General in deportation cases." Id. at 7.
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Nor does customary international law provide a basis for courts
to bypass the rule of non-inquiry. Arguably, individual human
rights law is now part of the law of nations. 2 04 If so, a nation could,
consistent with international law, refuse to comply with a request for
extradition on humanitarian grounds. 20 5 Such a view, however, is
not unanimous. 20 6 In any event, although customary international
law is part of United States law, 20 7 a statute or treaty overrides it.208
Therefore, customary international law does not provide the judici209
ary with a basis for overriding a treaty obligation.
V
THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY AND THE CONsTrrUION

In the absence of a statute or treaty provision enabling the judiciary to bar extradition on humanitarian grounds, only the Constitution can provide a basis for overriding a treaty obligation. 2 10 The
Supreme Court once stated that the Constitution has no extraterriThus, ratification of the Convention (with reservations) would not affect the rule of noninquiry. On July 19, 1990, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ordered the
Convention, with reservations, favorably reported. 136 CONG. REC. D905-06 (daily ed.
July 19, 1990).
204
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
205 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 476 comment h (1987).
In Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989), reprintedin 28 I.L.M. 1063
(1989), the European Court of Human Rights barred extradition of an accused murderer from Great Britain to the United States on the ground that the defendant would
face conditions on death row in Virginia which would violate Article 3 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, 224 (1955). The Convention provides that "No one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. at art. 3. The United
States is not a signatory to the Convention. Soering was ultimately extradited to the
United States after Virginia represented that he would not face capital punishment.
206
See In re Geisser, 554 F.2d 698, 701 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting view of Deputy
Secretary of State that "the treaty in question does not provide discretionary authority
to the Secretary of State to withhold extradition properly requested by the Government
of Switzerland" even on humanitarian grounds); M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 62, ch. II, at
102 ("[T]he view that executive discretion negates any duty to extradite under treaty
obligations may be in contradiction to international law"); Anderson, supra note 3, at
162 (questioning even "the executive's power to deny an extradition on humanitarian
principles"); Comment, supra note 3, at 298 ("the exact scope of the Executive's power
[to deny extradition] has never been expressly delineated.").
207
The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Filariga,630 F.2d at 880-81.
But cf L. HENKIN, supra note 185, at 463 n.69 ("the courts of the United States will not
apply international law to acts of foreign governments").
208
Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904
(1960); American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 770-71 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
209
Cf L. HENKIN, supra note 185, at 188 ("the Constitution does not forbid Congress or the President to exercise their powers in disregard of customary international
law").
210 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267
(1890); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1988); M. BASSIOuNI, supra note 62, ch. II, at 73; L.
HENKIN, supra note 185, at 137, 140.
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torial application. 2 1 1 That doctrine has since been repudiated, 2 12 at
least in situations involving United States citizens 2 13 and the viola2 14
tion of "fundamental" constitutional rights.
However, a defendant's treatment by foreign officials on for2 15
eign soil remains beyond the scope of constitutional protection.
Lower courts have recognized an exception when a foreign government acts as an agent of, or joint venturer with, the United States in
violating a defendant's rights. 2 16 However, since the government
In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
Reid, 354 U.S. at 12; Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); see L. HENKIN,
supra note 185, at 266-67.
213
Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 318 (1936) ("[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have
any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens"); L. HEMNN, supra
note 185, at 267 & n.69; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056
(holding fourth amendment inapplicable to searches, even by agents of the United
States, of property owned by nonresident aliens located on foreign soil), rehk'g denied, 110
S. Ct. 1839 (1990).
214
Reid, 354 U.S. at 13; Barr v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 819 F.2d 25, 27 & n.2
(2d Cir. 1987). In the "Insular Cases," (Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922);
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903);
and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)), the Court held that only "fundamental"
constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of unincorporated territories controlled by the United States. Fundamental rights are those which are "basic to a free
society," that are "implied in the concept of ordered liberty," and the denial of which
would "shock the conscience." L. HENKIN, supra note 185, at 269, 501 n.75. The "Insular Cases" recognized that the full scope of constitutional protection cannot be imposed
upon regions of the world "with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions," even
when those regions are under United States control. Reid, 354 U.S. at 14.
215
See, e.g., Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 817 (1984); Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1195-96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 856 (1980); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 n.9 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied,
504 F.2d 1380 (1974); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 963 (1965); Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 468 F. Supp. 920, 924
(S.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 908 (1980).
216 See United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v.
Emery, 591 F.2d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 71 (2d
Cir.) (United States government not vicariously responsible for defendant's torture by
Chilean authorities merely because United States had requested defendant's arrest and
expulsion; constitutional violation occurs only when United States plays a "direct or
substantial role" in the misconduct or where foreign police act as agents of the United
States rather than on behalf of their own government), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975);
Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 281 (defendant's torture by foreign officials gives rise to constitutional violations only if "the action was taken by or at the direction of United States
officials"); United States v. Lara, 539 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1976); Stonehill v. United
States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969). Some courts have
indicated that their supervisory authority over proceedings before them enables them to
exclude evidence seized by foreign authorities behaving in a manner that shocks the
judicial conscience, even absent participation by the United States. Barr, 819 F.2d at 27
n.2; Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Morrow, 537
F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir. 1976). United States courts have no supervisory authority over
foreign proceedings. Therefore, they cannot utilize this rationale to bar extradition on
the ground that the defendant will not receive a fair trial in the requesting country. See,
e.g., Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 988
211
212
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seeking extradition ordinarily acts strictly on its own behalf, the exception does not apply. Thus, the prevailing view that the Constitution does not bar extradition 2 17 or deportation 2 18 to a foreign
country likely to mistreat the defendant is consistent with both the
general doctrinal principle and the exception.
One commentator has suggested that the United States government's "voluntary decision to extradite, knowing" that the defendant will likely be denied fundamental fairness in the requesting
country, should be deemed a violation of due process: "a constitutional government should accept responsibility for the natural and
intended results of governmental actions .... ,,219 This approach
has ramifications far beyond international extradition, and its adoption would immediately raise serious separation of powers concerns.
For example, strict application of this approach could lead courts to
prohibit foreign aid to governments likely to use it in a manner inconsistent with humanitarian standards, a result irreconcilable with
(1976). Even if the requesting government's wrongdoing pertains to the manner in
which the defendant has been brought to the United States for extradition, United
States courts have no authority to impose sanctions on the requesting country. See
David v. Attorney General, 699 F.2d 411, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1983).
217 Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901) (Constitution has "no relation to the
crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a
foreign country"); Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir.) ("it has long
been settled that United States due process rights cannot be extended extraterritorially"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984); Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 349 n.9
(4th Cir. 1983) ("It is settled that the petitioner cannot block his extradition simply
because the other country's judicial procedures do not comport with the requirements
of our Constitution"); In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237, 1244 (7th Cir. 1980) ("While our
courts should guarantee that all persons on our soil receive due process under our laws,
that power does not extend to overseeing the criminal justice system of other countries"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1218 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972) (NATO SOFA Treaty); Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d
258, 264 (6th Cir. 1957) (" 'The guarantees [the defendant] seeks in this country have
no relation to offenses which have been committed within the jurisdiction of the demanding country' "), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1957) (quoting Neely, 180 U.S. at 122); In
re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 139 (D.NJ. 1987); Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F. Supp. 856, 866 (D.
Conn. 1959) ("Regardless of what constitutional protections are given to persons held
for trial in the... United States ....those protections cannot be claimed by an accused
whose trial and conviction have been held or are to be held under the laws of another
nation"), aft'd, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960) (emphasis in
original).
218
Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir.) ("It is well established that the
federal judiciary may not require that persons removed from the United States be accorded constitutional due process."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986). Deportation
presents a more compelling situation in which to extend the reach of constitutional protection than does extradition, because "[e]xtradition is subject to specific international
obligations while deportation is essentially at the option of the deporting country." In re
Geisser, 627 F.2d 745, 746 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
219
Note, Foreign Trials in Absentia: Due Process Objections to UnconditionalExtradition, 13
STAN. L. REv. 370, 375 (1961) (analyzing the Gallina dictum); see Gill v. Imundi, 747 F.
Supp. 1028, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 410 (E.D.N.Y.
1989).
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the separation of powers. 220
In short, present constitutional doctrine provides no basis for
bypassing the rule of non-inquiry. Any attempt to expand constitutional protection to shield defendants from extradition to foreign
countries which might treat them unfairly could result in highly
undesirable doctrinal ramifications and should therefore be
221
avoided.
VI
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY

Even if the undesirable doctrinal ramifications could somehow
be eliminated or overcome, policy considerations counsel strongly
against eliminating the rule of non-inquiry.
Courts have repeatedly acknowledged that extradition cases
often implicate important foreign policy considerations. 22 2 Those
considerations are often known solely to those at the highest levels
of the executive branch. By virtue of his absolute discretion to refuse to extradite, the Secretary of State 223 has both the legal authority and the practical ability to elicit and enforce2 24 express
assurances from the requesting country regarding the treatment of
the defendant. The Secretary of State can thereby ensure that the
defendant will be treated fairly and humanely.
Unlike the courts, however, the Secretary of State is able to
safeguard the defendant's rights without jeopardizing any foreign
220 See, e.g., Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954
(1976); see also Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 902 (D.D.C. 1982) (In suit seeking
to enjoin U.S. military aid to El Salvador, court refused "to examine independently the
President's certifications of the progress of El Salvador's government in the human
rights field ..
"), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
221 See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) ("Any rule of constitutional law that
would inhibit the flexibility of the political branches of government to respond to changing world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution").
222 See, e.g., Holmes v.Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 577 (1840); Geisser, 627 F.2d
at 755 (refusing to block extradition to Switzerland, noting that the Swiss government
was representing the United States in negotiations to free the hostages being held in
Iran. "This Court cannot conclude that the case of [this defendant] must take precedence over the other important friendly and cooperative relationships between the two
nations involved."); Peroff v. Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099, 1102 (4th Cir. 1977) ("The need
for flexibility in the exercise of Executive discretion is heightened in international extradition proceedings which necessarily implicate the foreign policy interests of the United
States."); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir.) (recognizing that judicial
attempt to impose limitations on requesting government in extradition case "might
cause embarrassments [sic] to the executive branch in the conduct of foreign affairs"),
cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973); In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127 (D.NJ. 1987).
223 See cases cited supra note 29.
224 Enforcement, of course, would be through diplomatic means. Shapiro, 478 F.2d
at 906 n.10. The implied threat that all further extradition to the requesting country
would be barred by the Secretary of State is perhaps the most effective means of enforcing that country's assurances regarding a defendant's treatment.
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policy interests of the United States. The Secretary of State is also
in the best position to engage in the discreet diplomatic maneuver22 5
ing the process may require.
In addition, unlike courts, the Secretary of State controls the
circumstances of surrender to the foreign country. Whereas a court
could only bar extradition upon finding the foreign country's procedures unacceptable, the Secretary of State can extradite subject to
226
conditions.
Ajudicial decision not to allow extradition to a particular country on humanitarian grounds may adversely affect important foreign
policy concerns. 22 7 At a minimum, such a refusal would offend the
requesting country228 and could lead to a retaliatory refusal to ex225 See, e.g., Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. District Court, 482 U.S.
522, 552 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("The nature of transactions with foreign nations,
moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on
secrecy and dispatch.") (citation omitted); S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 354
(1983) (Secretary of State "is considered uniquely qualified" to inquire into foreign
country's procedures "as this practice is already a significant aspect of his foreign policymaking responsibilities").
226

See In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 137 (D.N.J. 1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-

EIGN RELATIONS § 478 comment d (1987); Note, supra note 2, at 692.

227 See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 516-17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (courts should avoid "the
delicate situation of having to assess the neutrality and indirectly the good faith of the
sovereign seeking extradition, a circumstance that could adversely affect the conduct of
foreign relations" (footnote omitted)); Singh, 123 F.R.D. at 136-37 ("any judicial determination might embarrass the United States in its foreign relations and do harm to those
relations"); see also Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 375 (7th
Cir. 1985) ('judicial resolution of cases bearing significantly on sensitive policy matters
... might have serious foreign policy implications which courts are ill-equipped to anticipate or handle"); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (court sitting in judgment of foreign official's torture of civil
denied, 470
plaintiff "raises prospects ofjudicial interference with foreign affairs"), cert.
U.S. 1003 (1985); In re Geisser, 627 F.2d 745, 755 (5th Cir. 1980) (even "while properly
protecting the constitutional rights of individuals, the courts must tread carefully when
they draw conclusions concerning delicate problems of international relations in the
world of diplomacy"), reh 'g denied, 632 F.2d 894 (1980), cert. denied sub nom., Bauer v.
U.S., 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
228
See, e.g., Wise, supra note 3, at 722 ("it is a grave matter to accuse another State of
treating its criminals unfairly"). Even in civil litigation, the "act of state" doctrine, see
infra notes 293-96 and accompanying text, recognizes that "any state may resent the
refusal of the courts of another sovereign to accord validity to acts within its territorial
borders." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432 (1964); see also
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (courts have "little competence
in determining precisely when foreign nations will be offended by particular acts"), reh'g
denied, 464 U.S. 909 (1983); Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 552
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It is the Executive that normally decides when a course of
action is important enough to risk affronting a foreign nation"); Banoff & Pyle, supra
note 4, at 174 n.23 ("Several cases have arisen in which a refusal to extradite created
serious tensions between the requested and requesting state.").
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tradite fugitives to the United States. 22 9 The extradition treaty with
that country could be severely undercut or even rendered worthless. 23 0 Any judicial inquiry would necessarily touch upon highly
sensitive issues and thus potentially affect the relations between the
United States and the requesting country even if the court ulti2 31
mately permitted extradition.
A different conclusion is not compelled by the fact that courts
regularly decide whether or not the political offense exception bars
extradition. Unlike humanitarian exceptions to extradition, the
political offense exception is expressly encompassed within the
terms of extradition treaties. 2 32 Thus, the requesting country has
specifically consented to the determination, by a branch of the
United States government, as to whether the crime charged is a
political offense. 23 3 That the determination is made by the judiciary
as opposed to the executive should be of no concern to the request234
ing government.
A humanitarian exception, however, is not encompassed within
most extradition treaties. Under international law there is even
some question as to the executive's right to deny extradition on humanitarian grounds. 23 5 Were such a denial to occur, the requesting
country might be justified in alleging a violation of international law.
The United States, by using purported deficiencies in the requesting
country's procedures as a basis for refusing to extradite, would be
unilaterally depriving that country of the benefit of its bargain, the
mutual exchange of fugitives. The Secretary of State, who is in the
229

See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

§ 475 comment g (1987) (re-

fusal to extradite on ground that defendant would not receive fair trial or would risk
suffering other human rights violations "may give rise to diplomatic representations and
protests, and in some instances has led to retaliatory measures").
230 Courts have no authority to terminate treaties. L. HENKIN, supra note 185, at
170.
231
Singh, 123 F.R.D. at 136; see also Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir.
1990) ("The interests of international comity are ill-served by requiring a foreign nation
... to satisfy a United States district judge concerning the fairness of its laws and the
manner in which they are enforced."); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d
Cir.) ("It is not the business of our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising
the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign nation. Such an assumption
would directly conflict with the principle of comity .. "),cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 988 (1976).
232
Lubet & Czackes, supra note 26, at 193 ("The political offense exemption is
found in virtually every modern treaty of extradition.").
233
Typically, the extradition treaty provides that the requested party determines
whether or not the crime charged is a political offense. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122,
132-33 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing treaties); see also C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 171, at
45 (political offense exception is a freely made reservation of right to refuse to extradite
for certain crimes).
234
See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 185, at 399 n.81.
235
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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best position to assess the risks involved, should be the one to decide whether to take those risks.
Furthermore, as one court critical of the rule of non-inquiry has
admitted, "Congress [sic] and the executive branch do not enter
into extradition treaties with countries in whose criminal justice system they lack confidence." ' 23 6 This observation ignores the possibility that the ruling regime in the requesting country may be different
than the one which negotiated the treaty.23 7 However, it has been
noted that the "State and Justice Departments apparently shy away
from presenting extradition requests from" regimes "whose notions
23 8
of due process and fair punishment are dubious."
Nor is there any reason not to continue to entrust the Secretary
of State with the responsibility of ensuring defendants' fair treatment abroad. There is no indication that past Secretaries of State
have been less than diligent in safeguarding the rights of extradited
persons. 23 9 Although outright denial of extradition following a ju236 Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 411 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
Introductory Note, at 558); see Exparte Kaine, 14 Fed. Cas. 78, 81 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853);
H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 n.19 (1984) (citing Senate's refusal to consent to extradition treaty with the Philippines based upon human rights concerns); Anderson, supra note 3, at 160 (quoting 1977 testimony of Herbert J. Hansell, State
Department Legal Adviser, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee). One commentator has noted that "[u]ntil the 1840's the United States actually refused to enter into
extradition agreements because of concern that delivery of fugitives would be tantamount to becoming an accomplice of nations whose criminal codes were unjust." Note,
Extradition Reform and the Statutory Definition of Political Offenses, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 419, 426
(1984) (authored by Catherine Nicols Currin) (footnote omitted).
237 See H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-62 (1984) (pointing out questionable criminal procedures in 11 Communist nations with which the United States still has
extradition treaties, as well as in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, and
Haiti, all of which have extradition treaties with the United States); Banoff & Pyle, supra
note 4, at 172 ("almost half the countries with which the United States has extradition
treaties are reported to have engaged in human rights violations ranging from detention
without trial to torture and abduction").
238
Kester, supra note 3, at 1480. Kester speculates that the reason for this selfrestraint is that the Gallina dictum "probably has substantial in terrorem effect on United
States officials in deciding which extradition requests they will endorse." Id. There is,
however, no evidence to support that conjecture, which is especially dubious given the
fact that no court has actually applied the Gallina dictum to bar extradition in the 31 years
since it appeared. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. See also Prushinowski v.
Samples, 734 F.2d 1016, 1019 n.2 (4th Cir. 1984) ("It is, we should not forget, the State
Department that initiated the extradition proceedings, an unlikely occurrence were the
threat [of starvation in prison] articulated by Prushinowski real .... ").
239 See Ahmad, 910 F.2d at 1067 (Secretary of State has never directed extradition in
the face of proof that the defendant would be subject to indecent procedures or punishment; "[i]ndeed, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a Secretary of State
would do so."). One commentator who disfavors the rule of non-inquiry concedes "the
absence of hard evidence of persons being persecuted flagrantly after extradition from
the United States." Kester, supra note 3, at 1480; see also House Hearings, 1983, supra note
3, at 88 (testimony of Prof. Steven Lubet: "the executive has, as far as anyone can tell, a
perfect track record; there is not a single case where anyone has suggested that the
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dicial finding of extraditability is unusual, 240 the Secretary of State
has commonly exerted diplomatic pressure or formally imposed
conditions to guard against the dangers a defendant is most likely to
24
face. 1
For example, the Department of State has frequently surrenexecutive has turned a fugitive or a refugee over to a duplicitous or inhumane government"). Subsequent to Professor Lubet's testimony, the United States extradited an
accused Nazi war criminal to Yugoslavia, see Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.
1986), and deported two others to the Soviet Union, see Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024
(2d Cir. 1986); United Press International, Dec. 22, 1984 (reporting deportation to Soviet Union of Feodor Fedorenko, an admitted former guard at Treblinka, a Nazi death
camp). These cases, however, are unusual and may be explained by the extraordinarily
heinous nature of the crimes involved. See Kester, supra note 3, at 1480 nn.223-24. In
two of the cases, moreover, the courts expressly endorsed sending the defendant back
for punishment. See Artukovic, 784 F.2d at 1356 ("the public interest will be served" by
extradition of Nazi war criminal to Yugoslavia); Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1032 (expressing
total lack of sympathy over possibility of mistreatment in Soviet penal system of "a man
who ordered the extermination of innocent men, women, and children kneeling at the
edge of a mass grave"). Cf Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 514 n.34 (1981)
("mhere can be no question that a [concentration camp] guard who was issued a uniform and armed with a rifle and a pistol.., and who admitted to shooting at escaping
inmates... fits within the statutory language about persons who assisted in the persecution of civilians" and was therefore ineligible for a visa to enter the United States.). The
most infamous instance of State Department dereliction likewise involved the Nazi regime, albeit in a very different manner. In In re Normano, 7 F. Supp. 329 (D. Mass.
1934), aJew was found extraditable to Nazi Germany. Although the State Department
refused to bar extradition, it requested that Germany withdraw its extradition request,
which it refused to do. Ultimately, Normano was not extradited on the technical ground
that Germany had failed to deliver the extradition warrant to the marshal within the
statutory two month period. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 162 & 169 nn.76-77. It is
illuminating that critics of the rule of non-inquiry have to reach back to 1934 to provide
an example in which the rule-almost-led to a horrible injustice.
240
On only two occasions between 1940 and 1961 did the Secretary of State refuse
to extradite after ajudicial finding of extraditability. Note, supra note 20, at 1328; see also
Banoff & Pyle, supra note 4, at 191-92 ("Rarely has the executive branch refused to return an offender once the courts have approved extradition.") More recently, the Executive refused to extradite, despite a judicial finding of extraditability, in Jhirad v.
Ferrandina, 355 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y.); 362 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and remanded, 486 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1973); 401 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d
478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976). Although formally basing his ruling on a
technical statute of limitations defense which the courts had earlier rejected, the Secretary of State may have refused extradition because Jhirad had contended"that he faced
religious persecution in India, the country seeking his extradition. See Anderson, supra
note 3, at 161-62; H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1984). According to
Murray R. Stein, Esq., of the Office of International Affairs, United States Department of
Justice, the Secretary of State in several cases during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s refused to extradite following a judicial finding of extraditability. They include the cases
of Harold C. Banks (sought by Canada) and a Mr. Rodriguez (sought by France). In the
Rodriguez case, the Secretary of State refused extradition because France failed to provide adequate assurances regarding reopening the proceedings in which the defendant
had been convicted.
241
See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 4, at 206 n.136 (discussing assurances provided by
Venezuela before United States would return ex-President for trial); Note, supra note 20,
at 1326 ("When surrendering the fugitive, the State Department has frequently exerted
diplomatic pressure on the demanding nation to provide fair treatment"); Note, supra
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dered fugitives convicted in absentia on condition that the foreign
country permit a retrial.2 4 2 In cases involving allegations of political
persecution, the State Department tends to "instruct our Embassy
in the requesting state.., to follow the case and report to the Department of State. ' 243 The Secretary of State has even sent his Assistant Legal Adviser for Human Rights and Refugees to attend the
244
trial as an observer.
While assurances by the foreign government may ultimately
prove disingenuous, 2 4 5 the requesting government's interest in
maintaining good relations with the United States 24 6 and in obtaining the extradition of fugitives in the future provide strong incentives for a foreign government to honor its assurances. 24 7 While
perhaps imperfect, the system effectively balances the defendant's
interests against United States international treaty obligations.
A statute 248 requires the State Department to prepare and submit to Congress an annual report on human rights conditions
throughout the world. By entrusting this responsibility to the Department of State, Congress has manifested its confidence in that
Department's ability to act as a responsible and impartial human
24 9
rights observer in foreign lands.
note 2, at 692 (listing assurances obtained by Secretary of State before extraditing PLO
terrorist to Israel to stand trial for murder).
242
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 353 n.85 (1983); see Comment, supra note
3, at 306 n.147.
243
Sindonav. Grant, 619F.2d 167, 174n.10 (2dCir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912
(1981); see also Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 410 ("the State Department will observe the trial
abroad to ensure that its conditions are fulfilled"); Banoff & Pyle, supra note 4, at 192
n.88 (State Department "will make its concerns known to the requesting state, and will
sometimes condition the extradition upon appropriate assurances"); id. at 206 n.137
(referring to the "present American practice" of sending an observer to attend the trial
after "an American national is extradited").
244
Following the defendant's extradition to Israel in Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981), the State Department sent its Assistant Legal
Adviser for Human Rights and Refugees to serve as an observer at the trial. See Ahmad,
726 F. Supp. at 417.
245
See Anderson, supra note 3, at 163.
246
See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 435 (1964) (recognizing that "[fjoreign aid .

.

. provides a powerful lever in the hands of the political

branches to ensure fair treatment of United States nationals").
247
See H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1984) (violation of condition
imposed by Secretary of State "should be taken into account the next time the foreign
state makes an extradition request, and should cause the Secretary and the Senate to
reevaluate the extradition treaty relationship with the offending country").
248
22 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (1988).
249
It has been suggested that "the embarrassment to United States foreign relations
is likely to be more attenuated if a court questions another country's good faith procedures than if the State Department itself does so." Kester, supra note 3, at 1481-82
(footnote omitted); see H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1984). This argument fails for several reasons: (1) the State Department is already required to comment
on the requesting nation's human rights practices in its annual report to Congress;
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Moreover, the political offense exception protects some of
those most likely to face abusive treatment in the requesting country.2 50 Additional protections against abuse include the principle of
double criminality, which prohibits extradition for an offense not
25 2
criminal in the United States, 25 1 and the doctrine of specialty,
which restricts the foreign prosecution to crimes for which the de253
fendant has been surrendered.
Allowing the unfairness of a country's system to serve as a bar
to extradition would effectively immunize the defendant from prosecution. 254 It could have the added effect of turning the United
States into a haven for those who have committed crimes in that
2 55
particular country.
Deviation from the rule of non-inquiry raises other concerns.
Possibly inconsistent 2 56 or even anomalous 2 5 7 results will occur if
different courts, applying largely subjective standards, reach different conclusions regarding the procedures in various foreign countries. 258 Also, the expenditure of time and resources required to
examine the requesting country's procedures, including the use of
foreign expert and fact witnesses, would constitute an inappropriate
(2) the State Department can limit the embarrassment to foreign relations by controlling the tone of its public pronouncements on the matter; (3) the State Department can
extradite subject to conditions; and (4) the State Department, unlike the courts, can
ensure uniformity in its decisions.
250
Banoff & Pyle, supra note 4, at 201-02; Wise, supra note 3, at 721, 723.
251
See, e.g., Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 311-12 (1922).
252
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414
U.S. 884 (1973).
253
Wise, supra note 3, at 721-22 ("The problem of ensuring fair treatment may be
met, to some extent, by the principle of speciality .... "); see generally Note, supra note 2,
at 690-92 (discussing principle of double criminality and doctrine of specialty).
254
By contrast, in the Soering case, the European Court of Human Rights barred
extradition of an accused murderer from Great Britain to the United States, taking into
account the fact that the defendant would be extradited to West Germany and prosecuted there. For a discussion of this case, see supra note 205.
255
In a similar vein, courts have noted that the political offense exception "should
be applied with great care lest our country become a social jungle and an encouragement to terrorists everywhere." Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 894 (1981); accord, In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1041 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
256
See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 578 (1840) (recognizing importance of "uniformity" in extradition decisions).
257
See, e.g., Note, supra note 219, at 375-76 (noting that facially plausible standards
can easily lead to "anomalous" results, and providing example thereof).
258
See, e.g., Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1218 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
869 (1972). The Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty, even in civil litigation, for
a court to attempt to "discover not only what is provided by the formal structure of the
foreign judicial system, but also what the practical possibilities of fair treatment are."
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 412 (1964). Nevertheless, a somewhat similar function is performed by judicial and administrative officers in deciding
applications for asylum and withholding of deportation on grounds of persecution. See
Kester, supra note 3, at 1481 & n.231.
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and unnecessary burden on both the United States and its treaty
partners. As noted by the Supreme Court, requiring the requesting
government to send witnesses to the United States for an extradi259
tion proceeding "would defeat the whole object of the treaty."
In sum, the rule of non-inquiry is supported by strong policy
considerations, any of which could be undermined by a judicial attempt to sidestep the rule. Only the Secretary of State is qualified to
consider all factors in deciding whether to bar extradition on hu2 60
manitarian grounds.
VII
THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE

Courts have yet to address carefully whether the rule of noninquiry is mandated by the "political question" doctrine. The Ninth
Circuit has implied that it is. 2 6 1 In addition, a district court has
noted without analysis thatjudicial inquiry into the requesting country's procedures "would directly encroach on the power of the President and the Senate to make treaties, raising potential problems
under the political question doctrine." 2 62 Courts seeking to inquire
into the requesting country's procedures will have to confront this
259 Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 517 (1916), cited in Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478
F.2d 894, 902 (2d Cir. 1973) ("even today the transportation of witnesses thousands of
miles has elements of trouble and expense" and is therefore incompatible with the purpose of an extradition treaty); see also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 341 n.46
(1983) ("The Supreme Court has indicated that requiring the foreign state to produce
live witnesses in extradition hearings would tend to 'defeat the whole object of the
treaty.'" (quoting Binghara, 241 U.S. at 517).
260 InJennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 575, the Supreme Court observed that the power
to extradite
is the power of deciding the very delicate question, whether the party
demanded ought or ought not to be surrendered. And in determining
this question, whether the determination is made by the United States or
a state, the claims of humanity, the principles of justice, the laws of nations, and the interests of the Union at large, must all be taken into consideration, and weighed when deliberating on the subject.
Although that case established the exclusive authority of the federal government vis-avis the states over international extradition, the Court's observation could readily apply
to the authority of the executive vis-a-vis the judiciary. The opinion does not refer to
the judiciary; however, the case was decided in 1840, a time when the executive exercised complete control over extradition, so that the Court would have had no reason to
comment upon judicial interference in the extradition process. See supra note 53.
261 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 789-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882
(1986) (concluding that judicial determination of whether the crime charged is a pro-

tected "political offense" is not barred by the "political question" doctrine, but immediately contrasting that with "refus[al] to extradite on humanitarian grounds," for which
the "Secretary of State has sole discretion.").
262
In re Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. 1058, 1068-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-213 (1962)); see also In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 131-37
(D.NJ. 1987).
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doctrine, which confines the adjudication of "political questions" to
the nonjudicial branches of government.
The precise contours of the political question doctrine are
"murky and unsettled," 26 3 and the doctrine apparently encompasses
issues for which judicial abstention is mandatory as well as those for
which it is self-imposed. 2 64 Whether or not a particular issue constitutes a nonjusticiable political question is subject to case-by-case
analysis according to guidelines established by the Supreme Court.
In Baker v. Cart,26 5 the Court outlined the parameters of the
political question doctrine. 2 66 After noting that "[t]he nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation
of powers," 26 7 the Court analyzed the political question doctrine in
a variety of contexts and found several recurring themes:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
2 68
one question.
The Court concluded that "[u]nless one of these formulations is
inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal
for non-justiciability on the ground of a political question's
'26 9
presence.
The Court specifically addressed the political question doctrine
in the context of foreign relations, noting that "it is error to suppose
that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance. '27 0 Nevertheless the Court observed
that "[n]ot only does resolution of such issues frequently turn on
standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a
263 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); see also L. HENKIN, supra note 185, at 210
("That there is a constitutional 'political question' doctrine is not disputed, but there is
little agreement as to anything else about it ... .
264
L. HENnIN,supra note 185, at 212-13.
265
369 U.S. 186 (1962).

268

Id. at 208-14.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 217.

269

Id.

270

Id. at 211.

266
267
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discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature;
but many such questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement
271
of the Government's views."
The absence of case law analyzing the issue makes it difficult to
predict whether courts will decide that the political question doctrine requires adherence to the rule of non-inquiry. Some insight,
however, may be derived from cases involving the political offense
exception. Courts have held that judicial determination of the political offense issue is not barred by the political question doctrine.
In Eain v. Wilkes, 2 72 and again in Quinn v. Robinson,273 the government contended that the political question doctrine mandated
that only the executive could decide whether a crime was a protected "political offense" for which the defendant was exempt from
extradition. 274 The government advanced three arguments in support of its position: (1) resolution of the issue entailed a type of
policy determination wholly inappropriate for the exercise of judicial discretion; (2) pronouncements by the courts might conflict
with those of the executive branch, giving rise to potential embarrassment in the conduct of foreign relations; and (3) the issue
lacked judicially discoverable and manageable standards. 27 5
Both courts rejected the government's position, noting that a
determination that a crime was a protected political offense required
a court to determine only whether the crime charged was committed
during, and in furtherance of, a violent political uprising. These
are issues of "past fact" which courts are competent to adjudicate
and which require no policy determinations or political value
2 76
judgments.
The Quinn court further emphasized the politically neutral nature of the test used to determine whether a crime is a political offense. It observed that "[c]learly, if the application of the exception
required us to approve of the political goals of an uprising group,
executive discretion in granting protection from extradition would
277
be more appropriate than judicial review."
Likewise rejected in both cases, as well as in In re Mackin,2 78 was
the government's analogy between the political offense issue and
the examination of the requesting country's motives for extradi271

272
273
274
275
276
277
278

Id. (footnotes omitted).
641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
Eain, 641 F.2d at 513-17; Quinn, 783 F.2d at 787-90.
Eain, 641 F.2d at 514-16; Quinn, 783 F.2d at 787-90.
Eain, 641 F.2d at 514; Quinn, 783 F.2d at 788, 804.
Quinn, 783 F.2d at 788 n.6.
668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
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tion.2 79 The Eain court acknowledged that courts refuse to examine
a requesting country's motives to determine if its real objective is to
try the defendant for political crimes.2 80 The court, however, found
that principle inapposite to a determination that a crime was a nonextraditable political offense:
[E]valuations of the motivation behind a request for extradition so
clearly implicate the conduct of this country's foreign relations as
to be a matter better left to the Executive's discretion. The Executive's evaluation would look at the actual operation of a government with which this country has on-going, formal relations
evidenced by the extradition treaty and imply that the government
may be disingenuous. This obviously would be an embarrassing
conflict ....
A judicial decision, however, that establishes an
American position on the honesty and integrity of a requesting
foreign government is distinguishable from a judicial determination that certain events occurred and that specific acts of an individual were or were not connected to those events.... Thus, the
Judiciary's deference to the Executive on the "subterfuge" question is appropriate since political questions would permeate
any
28
judgment on the motivation of a foreign government. '
That analysis, subsequently endorsed in both Mackin 28 2 and
Quinn,28 3 suggests that the rule of non-inquiry may be mandated by
the "political question" doctrine. 28 4 Scrutiny of a foreign government's investigative, legal, and penal systems for fairness and humaneness is at least as intrusive as examining the motives
underlying a particular extradition request.28 5 Indeed, such a determination would require courts to examine the requesting country's
"actual operation" and assess the "honesty and integrity of" that
govemment 286-activities the Eain court found unsuitable for the
judiciary. 2 87 In addition, deciding whether the defendant will receive a fair trial and humane treatment in the requesting country can
come perilously close to requiring a political value judgment of the
288
type whose absence was deemed so significant in Quinn.
279
Quinn, 783 F.2d at 789; Eain, 641 F.2d at 516-17; In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 133
(2d Cir. 1981); see supra note 35.
280
Eain, 641 F.2d at 516.
281
Id. at 516-17 (footnote omitted).
282
668 F.2d at 133.
283
783 F.2d at 788-89.
284
See also In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 136 (D.N.J. 1987).
285 Singh, 123 F.R.D. at 136-37; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 412, 423,431-432 (1964) ("act of state" doctrine recognizes that even in civil
litigation, scrutiny of foreign legal system may interfere with foreign relations and
should be left to political branches).
286 Eain, 641 F.2d at 516.
287
See supra text accompanying note 281.
288
See supra text accompanying note 277.
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These considerations, combined with the fact that extradition is
inherently a function of the executive branch, 28 9 as well as the customary deference to the executive in matters involving foreign relations, 2 90 must be balanced against the rights of the defendant.
Although the need for judicial involvement is reduced by virtue of
the executive's discretion, 2 91 it is difficult to predict how courts will
2 92
effectuate the balance.
Even if courts ultimately determine that the rule of non-inquiry
is not mandated by the political question doctrine, the rule bears
sufficient indicia of a political question to warrant continued judicial
deference. The rule of non-inquiry is in many ways analogous to the
"act of state" doctrine, 29 3 which prohibits courts from judging gov29 4
ernmental acts of a foreign country performed within its territory.
That doctrine, although compelled neither by the Constitution, the
political question doctrine, international law, nor by notions of sovereignty, 2 95 nevertheless
ha[s] "constitutional" underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar
institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions
in the area of international relations. The doctrine... expresses

the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the
task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder
See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (matters pertaining to
conduct of foreign relations "are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference"), reh'g denied,
343 U.S. 936 (1952); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936).
291 See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 n.5 (2d Cir.) (court
more likely to intervene in protecting against unconscionable treatment of defendant by
United States when "conscience and justice demand a remedy"), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1001 (1975).
292 Courts have avoided invoking the political question doctrine where significant
individual rights are at stake. See Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1191 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985); Fritz W. Sharpf,JudicialReview and the PoliticalQuestion:
289
290

A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE LJ. 517, 584 (1966); cf. Louis HENKIN, CONSTrrUnONALIsM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 98 (1990) (political question doctrine "has been

invoked to foreclose judicial review" even where acts of Congress or executive acts related to foreign affairs have "impinge[d] on an individual's rights.").
293 See Michael Scharf, ForeignCourts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying the
Inquiry Provision of the Supplementary U.S.-U.K Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 257,
275-76, 279 (1988).
294 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
295 Id. at 421-23; L. HENKIN, supra note 185, at 218. Scharf, supra note 293, at 27075, 279, takes the position that the act of state doctrine is mandated by the political

question doctrine. Cf First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,
787-88 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he validity of a foreign act of state in certain circumstances is a 'political question'....").
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rather than further this country's pursuit of goals .... 296
That analysis of the "act of state" doctrine by the Supreme Court is
equally applicable to the rule of non-inquiry.
CONCLUSION

Balancing the right of a defendant to fair and humane treatment against international treaty obligations and foreign relations
concerns of the United States is a delicate matter. These competing
interests have been effectively reconciled by conferring exclusive responsibility for safeguarding the defendant's rights to the Secretary
of State. Allowing a defendant to challenge the fairness of the requesting country's investigative, legal, and penal systems in a
United States court would require a doctrinally problematic expansion of the scope of constitutional protection, could undermine important foreign policy concerns, and would entail undesirable, if not
impermissible, judicial interference in foreign affairs. Congressional efforts to enact legislation eliminating the rule of non-inquiry
have so far been unsuccessful. Unless and until such legislation is
enacted, the rule of non-inquiry should be inviolate.
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Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 423.

